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The Guantanamo Bay military commissions have been the subject
of intense national and international debate since they were announced
months after the September 1 lth attacks. This important debate largely
has focused on the perennial tension between liberty and security on the
one hand and the somewhat technical legal questions regarding the
constitutionality of prescribed procedures on the other. As significant as
these issues are, the discussion generally has ignored an element of the
military commissions that profoundly shapes how national security, civil
liberties, and the experience of criminal justice actually occurs: the way
that lawyers charged with prosecuting and defending these cases pursue
their professional duties as lawyers.
This Article considers the unique institutional identities,
organizational context, ethical obligations, and professional incentives of
* Dean's Scholar and Visiting Researcher, Center on National Security and the
Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to William Alford, David Cole,
Peter Conti-Brown, David Glazier, Victor Hansen, Philip Heymann, David Luban,
Thomas Morgan, and Stephen Vladeck for their helpful comments, and to the many
lawyers involved in prosecuting and defending alleged terrorists who agreed to be
interviewed for this Article.
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the commissions' military lawyers, analyzing how they shape and are
shaped by participation in the Guantanamo Bay military commission
system. This analysis is important not just as a framework for
understanding the troubled history of the commissions, nor only as an
interesting case study of organizational dynamics and identity theory.
Rather, a close look at the institutional identities, ethical obligations, and
professional incentives of the military commission lawyers reveals that
the military commission system is in desperate need of reform not simply
on the basis of constitutional concerns, but on the basis of legal ethics.
This Article argues that the institutional identity of the Judge
Advocate General's Corps (JAG) lawyers who operate the military
commission system influences these lawyers' response to the challenging
ethical issues and professional pressures inherent in military commission
terrorist prosecution. This analysis-based in part on interviews with
JAG and civilian prosecutors and defense attorneys-documents a
problem not yet addressed in the scholarly discussions of military
commissions: that the commissions are structured such that JAG
lawyers, a group institutionally identified with the highest standards of
ethical conduct, are effectively discouraged from adhering to those
standards. Although the courts-martial system in which these lawyers
generally operate is not without its own ethical pressures, the unique
dynamic present within the commission system effectively discourages
the type of ethical conduct these lawyers have traditionally viewed as
their highest priority, including zealous representation of clients and the
impartial administration of justice. This Article documents the pressures
faced by the commission lawyers and their causes, foremost among
which is the highly politicized nature of the commission system.
Recognizing and understanding how these often subtle pressures affect
the military commission system is important because, taken
cumulatively, -these pressures increase the likelihood of conviction in
ways that procedural reforms at the focus of academic, congressional,
and executive debates have not addressed.
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INTRODUCTION
The prison at Guantanamo Bay and the terrorist suspects it houses
have been a lightning rod in U.S. politics, legal scholarship, and
jurisprudence for the past decade. Since January 2002, when the first
group of detainees arrived, lawyers have been engaged in a frequently
litigious exploration of the legal problems presented by the capture,
detention, and prosecution of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. Even
before learning their clients' names, lawyers worked to win these
detainees constitutional protection through the federal courts. In the ten
years since September 11 th, these detainees have spawned multiple acts
of Congress,1 a significant number of White House executive orders,2
1. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006 & Supp.
2009); Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859
(2009); Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006); Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
2. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 16 (Jan. 27, 2009); Exec. Order
No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 16 (Jan. 27, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 16
(Jan. 27, 2009).
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and at least four groundbreaking U.S. Supreme Court opinions.3
Notably, the quest for a legitimate legal process to detain, prosecute, and
imprison these alleged terrorists has resulted in the creation of an entirely
new criminal justice system: the military commissions.4
These commissions have themselves provoked significant and
prolonged debate. But that debate has centered on the commissions'
(un)constitutionality, addressing such issues as the process due to alleged
terrorists, the applicability of international law, and, more fundamentally,
the purported trade-offs between national security and individual liberties
that many suggest inhere to the commissions' structure.5 While the
commissions' constitutionality and fairness remain hotly contested,6
victory must be declared, at least formally, for those who have advocated
their continued existence. Congressional action has blocked detainee
prosecution in federal court, and the commission system has produced
seven convictions in the over eight years that it has been active.7 It now
prepares to dispense justice to the "worst of the worst" 8 among the
3. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008).
4. The military commission system was established first by presidential fiat. See
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism, 66
Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). It was later established through congressional action.
See 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006 & Supp. 2009).
5. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Accused 9/11 Mastermind to Face Civilian Trial in
N.Y, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, available at http://nyti.ms/QSSi5s (covering
contentious debate between ACLU and other civil liberties groups and government
opponents to terrorist suspect trials in Article III courts); see also Stephen Vladeck,
Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts after Abu Ali, 88 TEx. L. REV. 1501 (2010)
(using trial of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali as a case study to analyze challenges of trying
terrorists in Article III courts).
6. See Stephen Vladeck, Do Military Commission Defendants Have a Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel?, LAWFARE BLOG (Dec. 29, 2011, 6:39 PM),
http://bit.ly/tMjXyQ; Owen Fiss, Aberrations No More, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1085 (2010)
(noting continuation of George W. Bush's controversial, unconstitutional policies under
Barack Obama); Daniel H. Benson & Calvin Lewis, Repeal of the Military Commissions
Act, 19 S. CAL. L. & SOC. JUST. 265 (2010) (advocating repeal of the Military
Commissions Act of 2009); David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda
within the Law of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957 (2009).
7. See Associated Press, Guantanamo Prisoners Who Have Been Convicted,
BOSTON.COM (Feb. 28, 2012), http://bo.st/AcUCLF; Peter Finn, Guantanamo Detainee
Majid Khan Pleads Guilty, Promises Cooperation, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2012, available
at http://wapo.st/Rv0E2C. The commissions have had several sustained periods of
dormancy, most notably beginning in 2009, when President Obama ordered a halt to
commission proceedings while a newly created executive task force explored whether to
continue the system's use. See Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 16 (Jan. 27, 2009).
8. Early in 2002, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld referred to the
detainees housed at Guantanamo Bay as "the worst of the worst," a phrase that has been
blasted by detainee lawyers given the huge number of detainees ultimately released from
Guantanamo by the U.S. government. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Some Guantanamo
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Guantanamo detainees, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged perpetrator
of the U.S.S. Cole bombing, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his four
alleged 9/11 co-conspirators. 9  These new prosecutions-the first of
which the government seeks the death penalty-will continue to
highlight the controversies and questions that the commission system and
its defenders have not, even now, resolved.
Those questions, however, are not simply related to constitutional or
international law. Largely overlooked in the Guantanamo debate have
been the significant consequences of day-to-day choices made by the
lawyers operating the military commissions and the way in which ethical
pressures inherent in this system, and the lawyers' perception of these
pressures, influence decision-making)10 This Article builds on previous
analyses and focuses on the Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAG)
lawyers who have been shaping the military commission process and its
outcomes in Guantanamo Bay. It analyzes the ways in which these
lawyers' institutional and ethical identities influence, and are influenced
by, the structure of the military commission system. A close look at the
lawyers reveals that there are subtle but identifiable institutional, ethical,
and professional pressures at work on the lawyers on the front lines of
the Guantanamo Bay military commissions: pressures that, taken
cumulatively, materially affect the allocation of justice and due process
in that criminal justice system.
The commission system is not alone in producing these pressures;
other criminal justice systems pose similar dilemmas. But while other
systems occasionally manifest the types of pressures and incentives
analyzed in this Article, particularly in terrorism-related prosecutions, the
Prisoners Will Be Freed, Rumsfeld Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, available at
http://nyti.ms/RcLuBU; MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF L. CENT.
POL'Y & RESEARCH, RUMSFELD KNEW: DOD'S "WORST OF THE WORST" AND RECIDIVISM
CLAIMS REFUTED BY RECENTLY DECLASSIFIED MEMO (2011), available at
http://bit.ly/UQkbel.
9. See Charlie Savage, Accused Al-Qaeda Leader Is Arraigned in U.S.S. Cole
Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, available at http://nyti.ms/uib34Z; Associated Press,
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Charged in Guanteinamo over 9/11 Attacks, THE GUARDIAN,
June 1, 2011, available at http://bit.ly/lkQBOp.
10. While the con'sequences of ethical pressures on commission lawyers has not
been the subject of much scholarship to date, the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law recently initiated a discussion of this topic at a symposium entitled
"Divided Loyalties: Professional Standards and Military Duty," in which a number of
speakers presented their views on whether and to what extent conflicting professional
standards and military obligations have impacted the global "war on terrorism" and the
military commission system in particular. See Symposium Archive, Divided Loyalties:
Professional Standards and Military Duty, CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.,
http://bit.ly/UFICAG. The recently published papers produced in connection with that
symposium can be found in Volume 43, Number 3, of the Case Western Reserve Journal
of International Law.
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commission system is unusual in the consistency and magnitude of the
ethical conflicts and professional pressures placed on its lawyers. This
Article documents, for the first time, the pressures faced by the various
attorneys on the front lines and their causes, significant among which is
the highly politicized nature of the commission system. 1 Recognizing
and understanding the way in which these often subtle pressures act and
are acted upon in the military commission system is important because,
taken cumulatively, these pressures increase the likelihood of conviction
in ways that procedural reforms at the focus of the current academic,
congressional, and executive debates have not addressed.
In describing the ways in which legal ethics and lawyer identities
influence the operation of the military commissions, this Article focuses
on the institutional identity of JAG prosecutors and defense counsel, and
traces how this identity has conditioned counsel's response to the ethical
challenges and professional pressures inherent in lawyering in the
military commission system. The JAG Corps has established a tradition
of high ethical conduct and respect for the rule of law. As a result, in the
early years of the military commission system, when political forces
overtly operated in the commissions to ensure conviction of the
Guantanamo detainees on trial, JAG lawyers committed to this
institutional identity were considered whistleblowers. In the case of
multiple JAG commission prosecutors, this meant resigning from their
posts. In the case of the majority of JAG defense counsel, this meant
engaging in an assault on the commission system's legitimacy,
notwithstanding professional disincentives against doing so. Although
the Obama Administration and Chief Prosecutor Brigadier General Mark
Martins have attempted to distance the commission system from its
troubled historyl 2-and, indeed, many scholars believe that Obama's
11. This Article is the first to analyze the ethical conflicts and professional pressures
faced by lawyers across the commission system and to consider the consequences of
these challenges for the legitimacy of the military commission process. It is not,
however, the first to observe that commission defense counsel face unique ethical
challenges. An increasing number of scholars, many of them practitioners before the
commissions or habeas courts, have presented the compelling narrative of counsel for the
Guantanamo Bay detainees. See, e.g., David J. R. Frakt, The Practice of Criminal Law in
the Guantanamo Military Commissions, 67 A.F. L. REV. 35 (2011); Alexandra D. Lahav,
Portraits of Resistance: Lawyer Responses to Unjust Proceedings, 57 UCLA L. REV. 725
(2010); Matthew Ivey, Challenges Presented to Military Lawyers Representing Detainees
in the War on Terrorism, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211 (2010); Peter Margulies, The
Detainees' Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices ofAdvocacy Strategies in the War on Terror,
57 BUFF. L. REV. 347 (2009); David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantdnamo,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 1990 (2008).
12. See Dina Temple-Raston, Justice Department Lawyers Play Role in
Guantanamo, NPR (Feb. 3, 2012), available at http://n.pr/zBp7jZ (observing that Mark
Martins "has been called Guantanamo's detox man ... because his mission is to provide
legitimacy to a military commission system that until recently was seen as extremely
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2009 statutory reforms to the commission system did improve the
constitutionality and legality of that criminal justice regimel 3-the
troubled history of the commission system remains part of the system
today. Despite extensive procedural revision of the military commission
system, the organization and structure of the system have remained
untouched by the 2009 "revamp" of the commission system. The
statutory improvements have also failed to remove the taint associated
with the military commissions' politicized past and history of detainee
mistreatment. 14 As a result, notwithstanding the presence of a more open
and transparent commission leadership, 5 JAG lawyers operating within
the system are well aware that the commission system remains
vulnerable to behind-the-scenes political manipulation.
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will provide the legal
and historical context necessary to understand the role lawyers play in
the Guantanamo Bay commissions and the commissions' unique
organizational dynamic. The history of the commissions are important
because they illustrate the types of ethical challenges faced by military
commission lawyers and the structural and institutional origins of these
challenges, the majority of which have not been altered by statutory
revisions to these military commissions.
Part II will frame a unique and endemic problem of professional
independence in the military commission system. The commissions'
structure and politicization have created a toxic environment for
principled lawyering. Part II will first explore some of the obstacles to
professional independence inherent in the military commission structure
and the ways in which the open politicization of the process in particular
has conflicted with the strong institutional tradition of independence and
rule-of-law among the JAG Corps. This analysis will reveal that
multiple factors-including the lack of clarity in commission law, the
toxic."); see also Morris Davis, Guantanamo's Deepening Failure, SALON.COM (Feb. 7,
2012, 11:00 AM), http://bit.ly/z5ph7c (noting Mark Martins's repeated use of the phrase
"reformed military commissions" and opining that its use aimed to the commissions from
past failures).
13. See, e.g., Scott L. Silliman, Prosecuting Alleged Terrorists by Military
Commission: A Prudent Option, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 289, 295 (2009); John D.
Altenburg, Jr., Remarks on "The Law of Counterterrorism," Georgetown University Law
Center (Feb. 2, 2011) (observing that the most notable difference between the military
commission system and courts-martial system is the admissibility of hearsay, and that
this alteration is appropriate and necessary for prosecuting law of war violations).
14. See Andrea Prasow, Hidden Torture: Behind the Plea Bargain of Majid Khan,
JURIST (Mar. 2, 2012), http://bit.ly/zRAhjt (observing that the military commission
system aims to keep the tortured past of GTMO detainees buried).
15. See MIL. COMM'NS, http://bit.ly/qoWOZj (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (the military
commission's mission is to "[p]rovide fair and transparent trials of those persons subject
to trial by Military Commissions while protecting national security interests").
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specter (or reality) of political manipulation, and professional
disincentives to ethically conscientious lawyering-impact the choices
made by JAG counsel. These factors will also show that conviction is
more likely in military commissions than it would be in Article III or
courts-martial proceedings, which calls into question the legitimacy of
the commission system.
Part III will explore the path ahead for the military commission
system. Building on the conclusions of Part II, this Part will advocate for
commission system reform to mitigate the fundamental legal-political
tensions that have plagued it to date. As long as the system is structured
such that all commission lawyers fall within the direct influence of the
Convening Authority-that is, the political appointee administrator of
the commission system-and the Convening Authority falls within the
direct political control of the President, these insolubility problems will
persist. Accordingly, Part III will advocate for reforming the system to
facilitate defense counsel autonomy, increasing institutional protections
for military judges, and requiring more public accountability for the
Convening Authority.
The prosecution of alleged terrorists presents a host of thorny legal,
moral, and political challenges, and many of these challenges would
apply in any forum in which terrorist suspects are tried. Given the nature
of these cases, the national security issues at stake, and the visceral
reactions many Americans feel toward terrorism allegations, there may
be no perfect forum for trying terrorists. Nevertheless, the lesson learned
from lawyers at Guantanamo Bay is that military commissions amplify
ethical challenges in a way that does not occur in the federal courts or
courts-martial. Because these challenges result in a justice system
slanted toward conviction, a close look at the lawyering on the ground in
Guantanamo Bay points toward the need for significant reform to the
commission system.
I. THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
In the wake of the September I Ith attacks, President George W.
Bush initiated a campaign to capture and detain individuals who had
facilitated that assault on the United States and who otherwise had an
interest in harming the United States through terrorist tactics. Those
detained would later be housed at a small naval base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba (GTMO) and would be tried by a military tribunal system
specially designed for prosecuting terrorists and punishing violations of
the law of war.16 Because the tribunal system-later called the "military
16. Mil. Order of Nov. 16, 2001-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831-36 (Nov. 16, 2001).
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commission system"-offered far fewer protections than those found in
the U.S. criminal court system or the military's courts-martial system, it
was immediately controversial among legal academics and civil liberties
groups. 17  Its early history, marked by mass resignations among
commission prosecutors and by allegations that the legal process was
being used as a vehicle for political expedience, only heightened the
controversy.
A. The First Guantanamo Bay Military Commission System:
Established by Military Order
Although the military commission system was established in 2001,
the first charges were not issued until February 2004.18 Initially, the
commission proceedings were conducted largely in secret; however, such
secrecy, in addition to abbreviated due process protections, quickly led to
allegations that the commissions were designed only to convict suspected
terrorists. 19 These criticisms were fueled by the 2004 resignation of four
JAG lawyers from the Office of Chief Prosecutor, all of whom alleged
that the then-Chief Prosecutor of the military commission system, Fred
Borch, had openly acknowledged that the commission trials were a
rubber stamp process. According to these prosecutors, Borch called a
meeting of his prosecutorial team to inform them that they did not need
to worry about acquittals because the commission panel would be
"handpicked. 20  He further suggested that the prosecutors need only
concern themselves with building a record for the review panel and for
"4review by academicians 10 years from now.",21 Questions had already
been swirling about the legitimacy of the military commission system,
22
and this controversy bolstered the widely held view that the commission
system was designed not to dispense justice, but to convict without due
17. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of
Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249 (2002) (arguing in favor of constitutional
authority to conduct military commission trials); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe,
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002)
(arguing against such authority).
18. Frederic L. Kirgis, United States Charges and Proceedings Against Two
Guantanamo Detainees for Conspiracy to Commit Crimes Associated with Armed
Conflict, ASIL INSIGHTS (Mar. 2004), available at http://bit.ly/VYTszH.
19. See, e.g., Kevin J. Barry, Military Commissions: Trying American Justice, ARMY
LAW., at 1 (Nov. 2003); Frank Davies, Military Lawyer: Terror Trials 'Unfair,' MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 22, 2004, at Al (quoting commission defense counsel that military
commission system was "designed to produce guilty verdicts"); see also Editorial, First
Steps at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://nyti.ms/dlgmTK
(noting that former commission prosecutors have called the system "rigged").
20. John Carr, A Few Good Men, 311 HARPER'S BAZAAR 23 (2005).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 17.
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process. After the Supreme Court invalidated the commission system in
2006 in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,23 the Bush Administration had limited
options. It consequently turned to Congress for enabling legislation.
B. Congress Replaces the Bush Tribunal System with the Military
Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009
On September 6, 2006, President Bush announced that Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, other alleged engineers of the 9/11 attacks, and
eleven other "high value" terrorist suspects had been transferred to
GTMO from CIA black sites abroad and would be prosecuted by military
commission as soon as Congress acted to authorize the process.24 The
transfer of these "high value detainees" to Guantanamo Bay spurred
Congress to speedy action. Less than four months after the Supreme
Court handed down its Hamdan opinion, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 ("2006 MCA"), authorizing use of military
commissions and establishing procedural rules modeled upon, but
departing in some significant ways from, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) that governs the military's courts-martial system. 26 The
JAG commission lawyers returned to work in earnest.
1. Military Commissions Prosecution
As the military commissions moved ahead, controversy continued
to plague the system. In May 2008, multiple military commission judges
barred the Convening Authority's Legal Advisor, Brigadier General
Thomas W. Hartmann, from having further involvement with multiple
pending military commissions.27 This action came eight months after the
Chief Prosecutor for the commissions, Colonel Morris Davis, filed a
formal complaint alleging that Hartmann had unlawfully attempted to
influence commission prosecutors-a complaint over which Davis
ultimately resigned.28 Davis alleged that Hartmann had pressured him to
23. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 561 (2006).
24. Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of
Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at
http://l.usa.gov/kxXFXC.
25. See Morris D. Davis, Historical Perspective on Guantanamo Bay: The Arrival of
the High Value Detainees, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 115, 119 (2009).
26. The significance of these divergences will be discussed infra Part l.C; see also
JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33688, THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT
OF 2006: ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL RULES AND COMPARISON WITH PREviOUS DOD
RULES AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, at CRS-1 (2007).
27. Carol Rosenberg, Judge Bars Pentagon Official from Guantanamo Prosecution,
MIAMI HERALD, May 10, 2008, available at http://bit.ly/W1 r8MU.
28. See William Glaberson, War-Crimes Prosecutor Quits in Pentagon Clash, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, available at http://nyti.ms/T57WcA.
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bring charges in specific cases, in violation of the prosecutorial
independence provided Davis under the 2006 MCA (a departure from the
courts-martial system). 29 Davis contended that Hartmann's conduct
amounted to "unlawful command influence," an attempt by a senior
officer to overbear a lawyer's independent exercise of discretion
(conduct strictly prohibited by both the UCMJ and the 2006 MCA).30 In
Hartmann's case, three commission judges held that he had overstepped
his role as Legal Advisor to the Convening Authority, although they
stopped short of finding him guilty of unlawful command influence.3 1
During this time, allegations also surfaced regarding then-Defense
Department General Counsel William J. Haynes II. Morris Davis
reported that Haynes had attended his hiring interview, in which
Hartmann had instructed Davis on which cases to prosecute first.
32
Hartmann had suggested Davis focus his efforts on "sexy" cases with
"blood on them" for political reasons (namely to gamer public support in
advance of an election year).33  Davis, during that same meeting,
referenced the likelihood of some acquittals in the commission system,
and recalled that Haynes's eyes went wide as he responded, "We can't
have acquittals [at Guantanamo]. If we've been holding these guys for
so long, how can we explain letting them get off? We've got to have
convictions. 34 Haynes tendered his resignation shortly after Davis made
the conversation public . Davis later testified that other senior Pentagon
officials, including Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, also
made it clear to him that charging some of the highest-profile detainees
before elections that year could have "strategic political value," and
urged him to take that course.36 Davis later provided similar testimony to
Congress.
29. See id; see also Rosenberg, supra note 27.
30. See Glaberson, supra note 28; Rosenberg, supra note 27.
31. See Adam Zagorin, Trying to Tie Obama's Hands on Gitmo, TIME, Dec. 8, 2008,
available at http://ti.me/4pabM3. As a result, Hartmann was restricted from further
influencing the three specific cases from which he had been barred, but he continued
operating in a logistical role in the commissions following the rulings and prior to his
retirement from the Air Force. See generally Carol Rosenberg, 'War Court Czar' Wants
to Retire, MCCLATCHY NEWS, Nov. 2, 2008, available at http://bit.ly/W3tniN (reporting
Hartmann's request to retire from the Air Force in February 2009).
32. See Adam Zagorin, Gitmo's Courtroom Wrangling Begins, TIME, Apr. 25, 2008,
available at http://ti.me/8KUuzb; see also Interview with Morris Davis, Former Chief
Prosecutor, Office of Mil. Comm'ns, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 13, 2012) [hereinafter
Morris Davis Interview].
33. Id.; see also Morris Davis Interview, supra note 32.
34. Zagorin, supra note 32.
35. See Pet. for Writ of Mandamus and Writ of Prohibition at 19-20, In re Al Shibh,
No. 09-1238 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 2009).
36. Josh White, From Chief Prosecutor to Critic at Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST,
Apr. 29, 2008, available at http://wapo.st/Rgflny.
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Under the Bush Administration, 28 detainees were charged, 14 were
referred to trial, and, ultimately, 3 detainees were convicted and
sentenced.3 7 The majority of Guantanamo detainees were released from
detention without resort to the military commission process. The U.S.
government initiated transfer out of GTMO for many of the detainees,
while others secured release by successfully petitioning the D.C. District
Court for writs of habeas corpus.
38
2. "Revamp": The Obama Administration and the Military
Commissions Act of 2009
On January 22, 2009, one day after his inauguration as President of
the United States, President Barack Obama issued three executive orders
initiating widespread policy reform with regard to Guantanamo Bay.39
Ongoing military commissions were essentially halted while multiple
task forces reviewed options for closing the detention facility and
processing the remaining detainees.4° On May 15, 2009, President
37. Edward F. Sherman, Terrorist Detainee Policies: Can the Constitutional and
National Law Principles of the Boumediene Precedents Survive Political Pressures?, 19
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 207, 243 (2010). Australian detainee David Matthew Hicks
pled guilty to one charge of providing material support to terrorism in March 2007. See
Press Release, DOD, Detainee Convicted of Terrorism Charge at Guantanamo Trial
(Mar. 30, 2007), available at http:/1.usa.govNRvsQu. Yemeni detainee Ali Hamza
Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul boycotted his commission proceeding, but was tried and
convicted of conspiracy and providing material support to terrorism on November 3,
2008. See Press Release, DOD, Detainee Convicted of Terrorism Charge at Guantanamo
Trial (Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://l.usa.gov/QSZkss; David Mcfadden, At Gitmo:
Life Sentence for Bin Laden Propagandist, USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 2008, available
http://usat.ly/RggOQ4. On August 8, 2008, Hamdan was acquitted of conspiring in
terrorist attacks but was convicted of providing material support to terrorism and was
sentenced to 5.5 years in prison, an effective sentence of six months of detention given
the time he had already served. Jerry Markon, Hamdan Guilty of Terror Support, WASH.
POST, Aug. 7, 2008, available at http://wapo.st/W3A84p.
38. After spending years awaiting a hearing before the commissions, recourse to
habeas corpus also meant freedom for several commission defendants, including
Mohammed Jawad and Fouad Mahmoud al Rabiah. See David J.R. Frakt, Mohammed
Jawad and the Military Commissions of Guantdnamo, 60 DUKE L.J. 1367 (2011).
39. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 16 (Jan. 27, 2009) (making major changes
in interrogation procedures available to the CIA and other government agencies and
creating a "Special Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies" to conduct a
systematic review of current interrogation and transfer policies); Exec. Order No. 13,492,
74 Fed. Reg. 16 (Jan. 27, 2009) (ordering closure of GTMO detention facility and setting
up a task force to review the status of each individual detained at GTMO to determine
whether and how the release or transfer of each detainee was possible); Exec. Order No.
13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 16 (Jan. 27, 2009) (creating the Detention Policy Task Force,
charged with identifying lawful options for the disposition of individuals captured or
apprehended in connection with armed conflicts or counterterrorism operations).
40. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40932, COMPARISON OF RIGHTS IN
MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT, at CRS-2
(2012).
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Obama announced that he would be revamping but continuing the
military commission process, though he made clear that he intended to
use Article III courts as the primary forum for detainee prosecution.4'
Congress was obliging. The statutory "revamp" left the commission
system structurally the same as the tribunal system that the Bush
Administration created; however, the "revamp" expanded appellate
review and built on other 2006 MCA protections granted to detainees on
trial. Reforms included a ban on evidence obtained by "cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment," a shift in the burden of proof on hearsay
evidence to the prosecution, and a new provision for appointment and
funding of "learned counsel" to assist defense counsel in capital cases.42
With the new statute in place, commission prosecutions moved forward
again, resulting in four guilty pleas between July 2010 and the present.43
C. The Military Commission System Structure
The military commission system is similar to the courts-martial
system in structure, but differs in significant ways. The majority of
courts-martial proceedings involve offenses such as barracks theft, child
pornography, or absence without leave from an assigned post that
typically do not involve substantial motions practice, voir dire, legal
research, or handling of classified information." Capital cases are
incredibly rare in the courts-martial system. 45 Commission proceedings,
on the other hand, require a very different base of knowledge and
experience than do standard courts-martial cases. Commission cases are
rife with international law, constitutional law, and law of war
complexities; require extensive legal research and brief writing; involve
41. Michael D. Shear & Peter Finn, Obama to Revamp Military Tribunals, WASH.
POST, May 16, 2009, available at http://wapo.st/DTtZx.
42. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
43. Sudanese Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi pled guilty in July 2010, Canadian Omar
Khadr pled guilty in August 2010, Sudanese Noor Uthman Muhammed pled guilty in
February 2011, and Pakistani native/former Baltimore resident Majid Khan pled guilty in
February 2012. See Associated Press, Guantanamo Prisoners Who Have Been
Convicted, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 28, 2012, available at http://bit.ly/OUL7wU; Peter
Finn, Guantanamo Detainee Majid Khan Pleads Guilty, Promises Cooperation, WASH.
POST, Feb. 29, 2012, available at http://wapo.st/Rv0E2C.
44. Telephone interview with Military Commission Defense Counsel (Sept. 2, 2011)
[hereinafter Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/2].
45. Between 1984 and 2011, there were 52 known capital courts-martial
proceedings, resulting in 16 death sentences, 10 of which were later commuted or
reversed. See Dwight Sullivan, Updated Military Death Penalty Statistics, NAT'L INST.
OF MIL. JUST. BLOG-CAAFLOG (May 30, 2011), http://bit.ly/nEVV8B. By way of
comparison, in a far shorter period, 1995-2001, federal prosecutors sought the death
penalty in approximately 159 cases. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE
REVIEW n. 17 (June 6, 2011), available at http://l.usa.gov/quByNL.
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novel legal and procedural theories; and, unlike courts-martial cases,
generally drag on for years. The commission system also lacks a clear
body of binding precedent. Under the 2009 MCA, courts-martial
precedent is persuasive in commission court, but not binding, and no
mention is made of Article III precedent.46 As a result, both military
judges and trial lawyers have faced a steep learning curve in navigating
this new forum. This learning curve has been made even more difficult
by extended periods without the guidance of any rules of evidence or
procedure,47 as well as the expectedly ad hoc complications of a newly-
established criminal justice facility and administrative body.48
1. Military Commission Judiciary
Commission judges preside over trials in the same way as federal
and courts-martial judges, but they operate in a far more opaque and
politicized environment. Like a federal judge, a military commission
judge oversees selection of a jury, or a "commission panel," as the jury
equivalent is called in the military commission system. Unlike the
random "jury wheel" that summons individuals for federal jury duty
from local voting rolls, but much like the courts-martial process, the
commission convening authority handpicks potential commission jurors.
Under the 2009 MCA, the convening authority is to detail jurors it
determines "are best qualified for the duty by reason of age, education,
training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament. 4 9 The
opaque criteria applied by the convening authority in selecting
commission members and the lack of statutory selection criteria led some
to speculate that the commissions are or may be subject to official
manipulation.50 This concern was amplified by early suggestions that the
46. See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(c) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (explaining that, while military
commission procedure is based on UCMJ procedure, the "judicial construction and
application" of the UCMJ are not binding on military commissions, a provision which
has the effect that neither Article III precedent nor UCMJ precedent are binding in the
military commission system).
47. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. MIL. JUST., NIMJ REPORTS FROM GUANTANAMO VOLUME
III, at 4, 8 (2010), available at http://bit.ly/Qedfl2 (describing the lack of a military
commission manual or rules as of April 2010, six months after passage of the 2009
Military Commissions Act).
48. These complications have ranged from intermittently operating courtroom
microphones to failures in real-time translation to the courtroom lights turning out in the
middle of hearings. Telephone Interview with Military Commission Defense Counsel
(Sept. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/7].
49, 10 U.S.C. § 948i(b) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
50. Sharon Kelly, Report from Guantanamo: Al-Bahlul Case Shows Trials Should
Be Held in Federal Courts, JURIST, Nov. 1, 2008, available at http://bit.ly/PoLgIO; David
McFadden, Bin Laden Aide Boycotts His Own Guantanamo War Crimes Trial with
Lawyer, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 27, 2008, 8:28 PM), http://huff.to/RxYe3r.
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panels would be hand-picked by the convening authority51 and by JAG
lawyers' experience with jury selection in the military commission
system.
Australian David Hicks's case was the first to make news on the
jury selection issue in 2004, when three seated panel members were
removed by then-Convening Authority John Altenburg in response to
outcries from defense lawyers and human rights groups.52 Through voir
dire in the Khadr case in 2008, defense counsel discovered that all of the
Air Force officers on the panel had specifically volunteered to serve on
the commission panel,53  raising serious questions about their
impartiality.54 During the Hamdan voir dire, defense counsel learned
that one member of the commission panel was a former Academy
roommate of the commander of the U.S.S. Cole,55 a fact only discovered
through an incredibly detailed voir dire questionnaire (the use of which
is, as in federal court, completely at the discretion of the commission
judge, not typical to courts-martial, and not used in other commission
panel selections).56 In another case, a commission judge refused to
dismiss from the panel a juror whose former Air Force co-pilot had been
a victim of the 9/11 attacks, despite protestations of bias made by
defense counsel.57 The commission panel selection process is as opaque
today as it was in 2004 when the first panel was convened, leaving the
system vulnerable to and subject to suspicions regarding political
meddling in the jury pool.
51. See supra Part L.A (discussing a meeting in which Chief Prosecutor Fred Borch
informed prosecutors that they did not need to worry about acquittals because
commission panels would be "handpicked").
52. Andrew Buncombe, Three 'Judges' Removed Due to Pentagon Bias, THE
INDEPENDENT (UK), Oct. 23, 2004, http://ind.pn/RjJm8i. Among the panel members
removed was an officer who had overseen an operation that transferred suspected
terrorists from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay, another was an intelligence officer in
Iraq, and the third caused controversy when he said he did not know the details of the
Geneva Conventions. Id.
53. Frakt, supra note 11, at 82 (citing an interview with U.S. Army Lt. Col. Jon
Jackson in August 2010). But see Morris Davis Interview, supra note 32 (noting that this
is actually consistent with Air Force standard practice, in which officers who are known
to be available are solicited to be panel members and asked to respond voluntarily).
54. Buncombe, supra note 52 (defense counsel successfully challenged each of these
panel members for cause); see also Mot. to Disqualify All United States Air Force
Members Due to Improper Panel Selection, United States v. Khadr, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1215
(Ct. Mil. Comm'n Rev. 2007), available at http://bit.ly/uNGVzH.
55. The U.S.S. Cole was a Navy destroyer bombed by al Qaeda on October 12,
2000, while the ship was refueling in Aden Harbor, Yemen. The attack resulted in the
loss of 17 sailors and a 40-by-60 foot hole in the ship. See U.S.S. Cole Memorial, U.S.
NAVY, http://bit.ly/auaL14 (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
56. Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/2, supra note 44.
57. Telephone interview with Military Commission Defense Counsel (Sept. 13,
2011) [hereinafter Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/13].
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The high number of problematic commission panel members is
particularly troubling given that the number of available members to
choose from is, in keeping with the courts-martial tradition, incredibly
small. The limited pool raises questions about whether the commission
system is capable of empaneling a truly impartial death-qualified jury. 8
In the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged "20th hijacker" of the
September 11 th attacks, 59 which was held in federal court in the Eastern
District of Virginia, the 16 jurors who heard the case were selected from
a panel of 900 potential jurors.60 Likewise, in capital cases on the state
level, it is not uncommon for the number of potential jurors to be in the
800s range.61 By contrast, only 20 officers comprised the original
commission panel convened to try the alleged 9/11 co-conspirators.
Given the logistical challenges already involved in detailing members of
the military to extended service in Guantanamo Bay for jury duty,
gathering 800 servicemen to empanel a jury comparable to that available
in the federal court system is simply not practical: a real problem in a
case where the death penalty is at stake.
Military commission judges also lack the authority that their federal
and UCMJ counterparts exercise over classified information. This
distinction is important given the volume of classified information
involved in commission prosecutions. Regarding classification, the 2009
MCA incorporates portions of the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA)-the classification statute applicable in federal and UCMJ
courts-but sends the very different message that protection of classified
information, not the rights of the accused, should be the judge's top
58. Capital cases complicate jury selection, as the judge must impanel not only an
impartial jury but also one in which each member would be willing to impose the death
penalty should the evidence call for it. Many commentators, and the U.S. Supreme
Court, have acknowledged that excluding non-death-qualified jurors may produce juries
"somewhat more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified."' John Quigley, Criminal
Law and Human Rights: Implications of the United States Ramification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59, 79-80
(1993) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986)).
59. Jessica Reaves, The Case against Zacarias Moussaoui, TIME, Jan. 2, 2002,
available at http://ti.me/4oIiyZ. Subsequent information obtained from Ramzi bin Al-
Shibh, alleged to be the financier of the 9/11 attacks, indicates that Moussaoui was
originally to play a role in the 9/11 plot but ultimately was rejected due to concerns with
his reliability. See Viveca Novak, How the Moussaoui Case Crumbled, TIME, Oct. 19,
2003, available at http://ti.me/TDKxEu.
60. Telephone interview with Military Commission Defense Counsel (Sept. 9, 2011)
[hereinafter Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/91.
61. See, e.g., CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 72
(2008) ("In Los Angeles County, 800 potential jurors may be summoned for a death
penalty case.").
62. Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/9, supra note 60.
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priority. CIPA permits a judge to order disclosure of classified
information, requiring only that the judge consider whether alternate
evidence (such as a summary or affidavit) could be used in place of that
evidence. By contrast, under the 2009 MCA, a military judge "shall not"
order disclosure of classified information.63 Instead, the military judge
merely serves a role in reviewing and ensuring the fairness of the
alternate evidence presented. 64 Likewise, the MCA "requires" military
judges to permit the government to introduce admissible evidence
without disclosing the "sources, methods, or activities by which the
United States acquired the evidence," provided the military judge finds
that such information is classified and that the evidence is reliable. 65 The
military judge may require the government to present an unclassified
summary of that source/methods information if it is "consistent with
national security," but the MCA makes clear that the judge "need not" do
so.
6 6
In other words, although there are similarities in the rules governing
UCMJ, Article III, and commission courts, the unique message the 2009
MCA sends to military judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel is that,
in the commission forum, the government determines what evidence is
classified (and therefore determines what evidence must be produced),
and all other parties must defer to that determination. Given the volume
of classified evidence involved in a commission proceeding, this
distinction creates not only a distinct advantage for the government in
commission court, it makes a real difference in how prosecutors and
defense counsel perceive the fairness of the commission system and
operate within that system.
2. Role and Responsibilities of the Convening Authority
The convening authority plays a central role in both the UCMJ and
military commission systems, serving as the administrator and
supervising judge of both systems. While the role and authority of the
convening authority may be similar on paper, in practice, the convening
63. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 949p-l(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009) ("Under no circumstances
may a military judge order the release of classified information to any person not
authorized to receive such information"), with 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4 (2006) ("The court,
upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United States to delete specified items of
classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant through
discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to substitute a summary of the
information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant
facts that the classified information would tend to prove."), and 10 U.S.C. § 949p-6(f)(3)
(2006 & Supp. 2009).
64. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 949p-6(d)-(g) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
65. 10 U.S.C. § 949f(3) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
66. Id.
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authority operates quite differently in the commission system. The
military commission convening authority has a distinct political
component that is not seen in courts-martial. The military commission
convening authority is appointed by the Secretary of Defense to serve in
that position indefinitely and operates under the direct control of the
Secretary, reporting directly to the DOD General Counsel.6 7
In courts-martial, the convening authority is a military officer who
does not serve in that role on a permanent basis, who has not been
appointed to that role by the DOD's political leadership, and who
operates largely within the military DOD hierarchy, as opposed to
reporting to the DOD General Counsel.68 Instead, convening authorities
typically are senior officers who have risen through the ranks-base
commanders, for instance-and who serve as convening authorities
when circumstances (namely, criminal action on-base) require it. The
courts-martial system also serves a very different purpose, aimed at
maintaining troop discipline and reinforcing respect for command
authority;69 as a result, a UCMJ convening authority typically enjoys "the
presumption of unbiased and apolitical decision-making that
accompanies the role of a military commander.
' 70
By making the military commission convening authority a political
appointee, Congress created a structure very different from the courts-
martial system: one subject to political influence and expediency in a
way that the courts-martial system is not.71  This distinction was
immediately perceived by JAG lawyers accustomed to operating under a
UCMJ convening authority, and the significance of it was reinforced by
the attempts to exert political influence over the system that followed.
This overt insertion of political forces into the traditional UCMJ structure
influences the perceptions and decision-making of JAG prosecutors and
defense counsel in the military commission system, as will be discussed
infra.
67. See DOD, REGULATION FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSIONS 3 (2007).
68. Gregory S. McNeal, Organizational Culture, Professional Ethics and
Guantanamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 125, 130-31 (2009).
69. See Note, Prosecutorial Power and the Legitimacy of the Military Justice
System, 123 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939-40 (2010) ("Historically, the maintenance of
discipline as a means of reinforcing the military's combat function was the primary
purpose of military justice. Since the discipline of the troops was primarily the
responsibility of the commander, the military justice system was seen as a tool of the
commander to enforce his authority over his subordinates. As a result, the commander
historically had virtually unchecked control over military justice.").
70. See McNeal, supra note 68.
71. See Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantanamo, Obstacles and Options, 103 Nw.
UNIv. L. REV. COLLOQUY 29, 34 (2008) (noting that ability of Secretary of Defense to
appoint a civilian political appointee as Convening Authority was "a substantial departure
from courts-martial practice").
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Unlike the courts-martial system, in which the convening authority
directs and is advised by the prosecution, the military commission
system created an Office of Chief Prosecutor intended to operate
independently from the convening authority-an innovation which has
caused some confusion. JAG lawyers are accustomed to the unitary
model employed in the UCMJ system, and the operational distinctions
between that system and the commissions are difficult to detect: the
convening authority (and its influential second-in-command, the legal
advisor) is expected to supervise and work closely with the chief
prosecutor, making the lines between advice from the convening
authority and attempts by the convening authority to exert "unlawful
command influence" over the prosecutor's office difficult to
distinguish.72 The blurry distinction between the UCMJ system and the
commissions has been exacerbated by the fact that, in the commissions'
past, its convening authority and legal advisor have attempted to directly
influence the chief prosecutor, with no significant condemnation of such
activity even after a full DOD investigation.73 As a result, commission
prosecutors accustomed to the military justice system find themselves in
some respects navigating new waters in the military commissions.
As others have suggested, by vesting the commissions' convening
authority "with all the power found in military commanders but without
the attendant command responsibility justification .... Congress allowed
for the creation of a politically-motivated organizational culture from
what should be an apolitical organization culture. 74 The commission
convening authority, the military commission judges, the prosecutors,
and the defense counsel all operate under the direction of the same
authority, the Secretary of Defense, just as they do in the UCMJ system.
Unlike the UCMJ system, however, the military commission system uses
political forces to appoint its convening authority directly, and that
convening authority reports directly back to these political entities.
Allowing direct political influence over a criminal justice system raises
questions about the legitimacy and fairness of the system. Moreover, for
JAG officers accustomed to operating in the rule-of-law-bound,
apolitical courts-martial, 75 the open presence of political forces raises a
72. See generally McNeal, supra note 68.
73. Although there was an official inquiry following Morris Davis's formal
complaint regarding Brigadier General Hartmann's conduct, the official response to his
complaint was a memorandum reiterating that Davis was beneath Hartmann in the chain
of command, receipt of which prompted his resignation. See Col. Morris Davis, Applying
the Law in Guantanamo: "The Government's Narrative Was a Lie," SPIEGEL, May 2,
2011, http://bit.ly/lmm9si.
74. McNeal, supra note 68, at 132.
75. See Ori Aronson, Out of Many: Military Commissions, Religious Tribunals, and
the Democratic Virtues of Court Specialization, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 231, 277 (2011)
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host of ethical pressures beyond those usually encountered in the courts-
martial system.
3. Office of the Chief Prosecutor
In June 2011, the DOD announced that U.S. Army Brigadier
General Mark Martins would take over as Chief Prosecutor of the Office
of Military Commissions in October 2011. Martins is one of the Army's
most well-respected lawyers, and his transfer to GTMO signals the
premium the Obama Administration has placed on ensuring the
commissions are viewed as legitimate going forward.76 In the UCMJ and
military commissions, the Office of the Chief Prosecutor typically is led
by a JAG lawyer, who operates in close collaboration with the convening
authority. Under the MCA, prosecuting attorneys (or "trial counsel," as
the MCA calls them) need not be members of the military. Although
each commission case has at least one JAG officer assigned, the
institutional composition of the prosecutorial team has varied." Martins
has made transparency an office priority, updating the military
commission public website, setting up a remote viewing site in the
Washington, D.C. area for those interested in observing commission
proceedings, and speaking openly about the process to the press and
national security community. He also has initiated a new wave of
prosecutorial hires. But while those who know Martins best are sanguine
about his ability to improve the appearance of fairness and transparency
("Military commissions, even under the more stringent MCA regime, and unlike the
time-honored institution of the courts-martial, are still subject to political involvement at
several important junctions-most notably, prosecutorial discretion and rule-making
procedures."). While the courts-martial system has been criticized over time as being
subject to political and command pressures, it is generally viewed as a fair criminal
justice system. See Benson & Lewis, supra note 6. But see Luther C. West, A History of
Command Influence on the Military Justice System, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1970).
76. See Peter Finn, Pentagon Names New Guantanamo Prosecutor, WASH. POST,
June 23, 2011, available at http://wapo.st/j 1CtZZ; Jack Goldsmith, Mark Martins to Be
Chief Prosecutor, Military Commissions, LAWFARE BLOG (June 23, 2011, 5:38 PM),
http://bit.ly/VXaOyg; Benjamin Wittes, The Next Step in Establishing the Legitimacy of
Military Commissions, LAWFARE BLOG (July 1, 2011, 3:32 PM), http://bit.ly/mSWYZ 1.
77. For instance, while the Jawad and al Bahlul cases were prosecuted by JAG
lawyers, the Hamdan prosecution team was comprised largely of Department of Justice
lawyers, led by lawyers from OLC, and including an Assistant U.S. Attorney and
Department of Justice National Security Division lawyers. See Mil. Comm'n Interview
9/7, supra note 48; Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/2, supra note 44. JAG prosecutors learned
early on that the Secretary of Defense intended to shift prosecutorial responsibility to
attorneys from the Department of Justice's National Security Division out of concern that
JAG lawyers lacked sufficient experience to try terrorist cases. See Ruling on Mot. to
Dismiss, United States v. Hamdan, CMCR No. 09-002 (Ct. Mil. Comm'n Rev. 2007),
available at http://bit.ly/Os9osB.
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of the commissions,78 questions remain about whether the commission's
problems are capable of repair.
4. Office of the Chief Defense Counsel
As in the UCMJ system, the Office of Chief Defense Counsel in the
commission system is subject to a military chain of command, but the
commissions' unique institutional dynamic ensures that the office
operates in a much different climate than does its courts-martial
counterpart. The convening authority in courts-martial is the commander
of a group of service members, including the service member on trial.
As such, he or she has some interest in the well-being of the defendant
and, more importantly, a strong interest in the appearance of a just result,
as the purpose of a court-martial is to maintain good order and discipline
among the ranks. In contrast, the convening authority in the commission
system is a political appointee who has little shared identity or interest in
the well-being of a charged terrorist. He or she may have an interest in
ensuring a fair proceeding to ensure ongoing public support for the
commissions and international support for counterterror efforts, and
generally out of respect for rule-of-law principles. As a political
appointee charged with the task of convicting suspected terrorists,
however, the military commission convening authority does not have the
same incentive as a courts-martial convening authority to ensure the
fullest, most rigorous adversarial process. For instance, in both courts-
martial and the commission system, defense counsel relies on the
convening authority for staffing and for funding its investigators, experts,
and (in capital cases) civilian counsel. The political nature of the
military commission convening authority, however, results in distinct
differences in the freedom with which defense counsel operates in the
commission system and in defense counsel's perception of whether they
are being dealt an even hand.
The political nature of the convening authority is not the only
significant distinction between the two systems for JAG defense counsel.
In the UCMJ system, JAG defense lawyers act in a chain of military
command that often includes the convening authority, but these lawyers
also have a chain of command outside and apartfrom the leadership and
authority of a convening authority in the form of each military's legal
services division. For instance, a JAG lawyer stationed at an Air Force
base in the U.S. Western Region may seek funding from the convening
authority or commanding officer of the Air Force base where the court
martial is located; however, he or she may also have recourse to the
78. See sources cited supra note 76.
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senior defense counsel for the Western Region, who is a member of the
Air Force Legal Services Agency and is thus outside the convening
authority's control or influence.79 JAG lawyers in the Office of Chief
Defense Counsel do not have similar recourse.
Although funding for the Office of Chief Defense Counsel has
improved under the current convening authority, Bruce MacDonald,
historically it has been inadequate. 80  In its infancy, the convening
authority for the military commissions developed a reputation among
commission defense counsel for heavily favoring the prosecution: the
common view among defense lawyers was that Susan Crawford, who
served as convening authority from 2007 to 2010, had only one stamp on
her desk, and it said "denied.,'8 She routinely would reject funding,
travel, investigative, and expert requests, even when those requests were
82plainly necessary or supported by the prosecution. In response, defense
counsel have been creative to make up the difference, doing their best to
employ cost-free litigation tools. Specifically, defense counsel makes
full use of their ability to speak publicly about their cases and to lobby
foreign governments to seek and accept transfer of the detainees they
represent, tactics that have occasionally engendered the irritation of the
prosecution and convening authority.83
79. Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/7, supra note 48.
80. Telephone interview with Military Commission Defense Counsel (Aug. 5, 2011)
[hereinafter Mil. Comm'n Interview 8/5]; see also David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a
Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT'L SEC. LAW & POL'Y 1, 65-66 (2011) (noting
outstanding questions regarding adequacy of resources available to defense counsel;
Prosecuting Terrorists: Civilian and Military Trials for GTMO and Beyond: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
llth Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel, DOD) (expressing
concern that defense counsel receive adequate training and resources to handle capital
cases)).
81. Mil. Comm'n Interview 8/5, supra note 80. Susan Crawford was appointed to
Convening Authority from her position as chief of staff to David Addington, then-Vice
President Cheney's outspoken and hawkish legal counsel. Scott Horton, The Great
Guantanamo Puppet Theatre, HARPER'S MAG (Feb. 21, 2008, 8:24 AM),
http://bit.ly/RU 130i.
82. Decl. of Lt. Col. Darrel J. Vandeveld 5, United States v. Jawad, CMCR No.
08-004 (Mil. Comm'n Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba Sept. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Vandeveld
Decl. 1], available at http://bit.ly/Qrpro3 (noting Convening Authority's refusal to
authorize the defense to have an independent physician review Jawad's health records,
notwithstanding his support for the motion).
83. Defense counsel has also relied upon pro bono assistance from nonprofit
organizations like the ACLU, individual pro bono attorneys, and various law schools,
including Duke and Yale, whose students have provided invaluable research and,
occasionally, brief-writing assistance. See News Brief, The Guantanamo Defense Clinic:
Three Years of Groundbreaking Litigation, 27 DuKE L. MAG. 1, 10 (Winter 2009),
available at http://bit.ly/SXlRXY; Susan Gonzalez, Yale Law School Students Fighting
for Justice for Guantanamo, YALE NEWs, Apr. 3, 2009, available at
http://bit.ly/UVYAkR; Mil. Comm'n Interview 8/5, supra note 80.
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In recent years, the financial and staffing independence 84 of the
Office of Chief Defense Counsel has improved, largely due to the
appointment of less openly political leadership in the convening
authority and Office of Chief Prosecutor's office. Nevertheless, the
reality of the commission system is that defense counsel's ability to
advocate effectively for their clients is dependent in large part upon the
benevolence of the convening authority: a political entity. For instance,
current convening authority Bruce MacDonald has granted the Chief
Defense Counsel authority to veto the proposed transfer of defense
counsel if he or she so chooses and to approve any military lawyers
appointed as defense counsel, which provides the Office of Chief
Defense Counsel some personnel control.85 None of these institutional
protections, however, are mandated by the MCA or any of the
regulations or rules created for the commissions; rather, they are
essentially a gift of the current convening authority, a military officer
interested in improving the commission's fairness. Accordingly, there
are no structural or institutional guarantees that this convening
authority's generosity will carry forward. Indeed, defense counsel's
ability to access funds, to adequately staff its cases, and to ensure the
independence of its personnel is subject to the whims of the convening
authority, just as it was in 2001. This presents a problem not only in
terms of the system's basic fairness, but also in terms of the ethical
challenges such uncertainty and politicization place on defense counsel.
II. OBSTACLES TO ETHICAL COMMISSION LAWYERING
The commission history and structure detailed above explains the
unique legal and political dynamics at work within the commission
system--dynamics in part responsible for the ethical obstacles JAG
lawyers face in the commissions. Yet, to understand the ways in which
this system amplifies similar, but distinct, ethical challenges seen in
Article III and UCMJ courts, one must understand how the JAG
institutional identity shapes lawyers' responses to the commissions'
unique structure. This Part will engage in that analysis. A close
inspection of the commissions' structure, as seen through the lens of JAG
84. In the early days of the commissions, all military defense counsel were
individually selected by the Convening Authority for their posts. While many lawyers
volunteered for a defense post at GTMO, others were simply assigned. See, e.g., Frakt,
supra note 11, at 1371 (noting that he volunteered and was selected to serve as military
commission defense counsel). Defense counsel Charles Swift, who represented Salim
Hamdan, actually requested to be detailed to the prosecution, but was detailed to the
defense instead. Luban, supra note 11, at 2007. Interestingly, Morris Davis volunteered
for assignment to defense counsel but was assigned to the Office of Chief Prosecutor
instead. See Morris Davis Interview, supra note 32.
85. Frakt, supranote 11, at 1371.
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lawyers, reveals that the professional disincentives for conscientious
ethical conduct, the ever-present specter of political manipulation, and
the lack of clarity in commission law that hangs over each ruling amplify
the typical ethical pressures inherent in terrorist prosecution in any
forum. These obstacles to ethical decision-making favor conviction in a
way not seen in Article III courts or courts-martial, thus raising doubts
about the viability of the commissions as a forum for terrorist
prosecution.
Although a line of scholarship exists dedicated to the perspectives
of the lawyers on the front lines in Guantanamo Bay,16 this scholarship
has been overlooked in the larger debate over the constitutionality and
general appropriateness of the military commissions as a forum for trying
suspected terrorists. Likewise, the larger debate has done little to
incorporate the important work of legal ethicists like David Luban and
Norman Spaulding, whose scholarship focuses on lawyers, their ethical
challenges, and the ways in which lawyers shape the production of law. 7
Focusing on the ethical challenges faced by different groups of lawyers
on the ground at Guantanamo Bay unites these disparate strains of
scholarship to provide new insight into whether the commission system
functions as it should. This on-the-ground ethical analysis reveals that
the commission system is in need of reform.
Lawyers operating in various capacities in the military commission
system are subject to institutional, bureaucratic, and political pressures
that are in tension with the rules of professional responsibility. Although
the public resignations and dramatic lawyering of JAG commission
lawyers to date suggest that many of these lawyers have refused to allow
disincentives to ethical lawyering to cloud their professional judgment, it
is impossible to know if, where, and how other lawyers have failed to act
with the same moral valor. The fact that JAG lawyers have been called
upon to act in such dramatic fashion to call attention to the failings in the
commission system-many of which remain unchanged despite recent
86. See Frakt, supra note 11; Lahav, supra note 11; Ivey, supra note 11; Margulies,
supra note 11.
87. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HuMAN DIGNITY 131-32 (2007); see also
Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting the Jena Six, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1309 (2008)
(noting how Professor Luban's ideal of moral activism "locates moral responsibility for
injustice in the daily practice of law," such as the judgment of local prosecutors that can
be made based on "insider's and outsider's perspectives of moral obligation"); Susan
Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1311, 1313 (2008) (citing with favor
Luban's inquiry into the integrity of individual lawyers and how integrity operates within
an institutional role); cf. Norman Spaulding, The Rule-of-law in Action: A Defense of
Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1377, 1408-11 (2008) (analyzing the role
of individual lawyers with regard to the torture memoranda but advocating for a greater
focus on the adversarial process to more fully understand these issues).
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reforms-raises serious questions about the capacity of the commission
system to dispense justice.
Although JAG lawyers' dual role as officer and lawyer may make
them more likely than civilian lawyers to face professional disincentives
to principled lawyering when operating in a military justice system, their
unique rule-of-law-based institutional identity in some respects makes
them better-suited to participate in this hotly adversarial and highly
political criminal justice system. Indeed, the early days of the
commission system may have played out differently, perhaps with fewer
resignations, had the Office of Chief Prosecutor been staffed with
volunteer DOJ prosecutors rather than JAG officers. To some extent,
JAG lawyers' personal and institutional commitment to the rule of law
makes them the perfect subjects to test this newly minted criminal justice
system.
This Part will assess the institutional identities and ethical
obligations of the lawyers on the front lines of the Guantanamo military
commissions-a necessary predicate for understanding whether the
current military commission system is conducive to ethical conduct and
the principles of justice and fairness. This analysis reveals that multiple
factors, including the lack of clarity in commission law, the specter (or
reality) of political manipulation, and the professional disincentives
facing a military lawyer who fully embraces either a minister of justice
or advocate role, impact the choices made by JAG counsel. These
factors cumulatively make conviction more likely than it would be in
other court systems, thus calling into question the legitimacy of the
commission system.
A. Professional Independence and JAG Institutional Identity
JAG lawyers are widely recognized as a rare breed of lawyer, and
their unique institutional identity makes them well suited for work in the
military commissions. As David Luban observed:
In obvious ways, JAGs' identity as lawyers sets them apart from
other military officers. Some, to be sure, began their career as
warriors [but] . . . [w]hile many JAGs regard themselves proudly as
warriors and lawyers, common-sense psychology suggests that their
dual identity may make them more, rather than less, zealous than
civilian lawyers in their defense of rule-of-law values.
88
JAG lawyers' stubborn adherence to the rule of law is well known.
Their institutional intransigence has caused professors Glenn Sulmasy
and John Yoo to question whether the JAG Corps' observance of the rule
88. Luban, supra note 11, at 2000.
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of law, even when in tension with command authority, represents a
challenge to civilian control of the military. 89 As Lieutenant Colonel
Colby Vokey, former counsel to Omar Khadr, explained: "[T]he oath
[military officers take] is to support and defend the constitution of the
United States .... [Y]ou're not swearing to the president or to a general;
that's what your oath is, to support and defend the constitution.' 90 In
effect, the rule of law is the JAG lawyer's commander-in-chief. 9'
The multiple roles JAG lawyers play as part of their job-
prosecutor, military advisor, or defense counsel, depending on the day-
strengthen this institutional identity. Although many of the JAG lawyers
on either the defense or prosecution side of the commissions were chosen
for their respective positions at personal request, thus manifesting
identification with one side or the other, 92 a large number of the JAG
lawyers serving on the front lines of the military commissions are there
simply because they are following orders. Because JAG lawyers
frequently switch back and forth between prosecutor and defense
counsel, their institutional and ethical identities are more closely tied to
the JAG Corps and its ideals than to specific adversarial roles. 93  In
contrast, advocates in the federal court system frequently have very
strong personal associations with their role as prosecutor or defense
counsel.94 The JAG lawyer's lack of entrenched institutional affiliation
with either the prosecution or the defense reduces a lawyer's natural
inclination to form a partisan bias that could shade ethical judgment,
thereby increasing the likelihood that a JAG will operate from an
independent perspective.95
89. See Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military:
A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1815 (2007).
90. David J.R. Frakt, The Myth of Divided Loyalties: Defending Detainees and the
Constitution in the Guantanamo Military Commissions, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 545,
559-60 (2011) (citing Michelle Shepard, Khadr Goes On Trial, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 29,
2007, available at http://bit.ly/UWOems).
91. See Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield- An Empirical
Account ofInternational Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (2010). JAG lawyers
receive significant rule-of-law training beyond the law degree they must acquire from an
accredited law school; they also participate in regular training from seasoned JAG
officers over the course of their career. Id. at 112-13.
92. Mil. Comm'n Interview 8/5, supra note 80.
93. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42
CONN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2009).
94. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of
Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REv. 163, 1086-87 (1997) (describing "role-
differentiated morality" phenomenon among prosecution and defense counsel).
95. Dickinson, supra note 91, at 6; see also Robertson, supra note 93, at 6 ("[T]he
stronger [the lawyers'] partisan affiliation with their clients or with a related social cause,
the greater the risk that they will lack an independent perspective.").
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The usefulness of lawyering from a perspective unattached to a
specific adversarial role has been widely discussed in legal scholarship.
Cassandra Burke Roberston of Case Western Reserve Law School relies
on social science literature to argue that, when lawyers adopt
wholeheartedly an adversarial role or scientific cause, this partisan
affiliation frequently and unconsciously dictates the way in which they
perceive evidence and evaluate the merits of their case.96 Accordingly, a
lawyer with a strong partisan identity may lose the ability to operate with
competent and independent judgment,97 a serious problem when, as in
the commission system, he or she is called upon to make challenging
ethical judgments with significant professional and national security
consequences. While JAG lawyers are as subject to partisan biases as
any other lawyer, their devotion to the rule-of-law, rather than a partisan
identity, may insulate them somewhat from unconscious biases that
otherwise might cloud legal judgment.
98
Norman Spaulding's "thin professional identity" model appears to
corroborate that conclusion. Spaulding advocates grounding a lawyer's
role in what he calls a "logic of service," rather than in close
identification with a specific client's cause.99 In other words, ethical
lawyering occurs most reliably when lawyers focus their efforts on
serving their client without closely identifying themselves with their
client's interests. Spaulding describes lawyers operating under a service
norm as possessing "thin professional identity," which he explains is a
''commitment to the principle that effective service and open access to
law demand uninhibited orientation of their faculties towards the
realization of their clients' lawful objectives."'100 He contrasts this "thin
identity," which he views as the ideal, with "thick professional identity,"
in which a lawyer comes to so closely identify with her client that
representing that individual becomes a self-interested pursuit, a
"perversion of the service norm."'' 1 Spaulding asserts such perversion is
more likely to result in professional misconduct and broader ethical
problems like role confusion, lawlessness, and misdistribution of legal
96. See generally Robertson, supra note 93 (discussing various unconscious
cognitive biases that impact legal judgment, such as selective attention, selective recall,
selective interpretation, and bias blind spot).
97. Id. at 9.
98. See generally Robertson, supra note 93.
99. See Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1, 3-8 (2002) (discussing the legal ethics concept of "identification," in which
lawyers are to assume their clients' interests as a "second self"); see also Norman W.
Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1031 (2008); Norman W. Spaulding, Independence, Experimentalism, and
Resistance to Law in the Department of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REv. 409 (2011).
100. Spaulding, supra note 99, at 7-8.
101. Id.
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services. Legendary defense attorney Robert Bennett articulated the
same concern with regard to the dangers of acquiring this type of "thick
identity" with a client's cause: "[Y]ou must never become so close to
your clients that you lose your independence, objectivity, or ability to do
what is right," warning that it can result in "slanted" advice.
102
Applying Spaulding's legal ethics framework, JAG lawyers'
experience as prosecutor, defense counsel, and legal advisor provides
them a distance from a specific adversarial role, a distance that improves
their ability to subscribe to a "thin professional identity" model. Their
focus on the rule of law is strikingly similar to the focus on "the principle
of effective service and open access to law" that Spaulding advocates.
This focus stands in contrast to the dangerous "thick professional
identity" frequently battled by lawyers linked exclusively to either the
prosecution or the defense, lawyers who so intensely identify with their
own role in the adversarial system or with their client that professional
misconduct or role confusion is more likely.10 3 In other words, JAG
lawyers' institutional commitment to the JAG Corps, rather than an
adversarial role, may make them better suited to balance difficult ethical
obligations when those are in conflict with their own personal
interests. 1
04
Indeed, the military commission system has been a case study in
brave and assertive lawyering in the face of ethical challenges. While
opponents of the commission system might attribute these aggressive
moral actions to a reaction to the deep unconstitutional unfairness of the
system,'0 5 the JAG's ingrained institutional commitment to ethical duty
and the principles of fairness that undergird the courts-martial system
(e.g., no unlawful command influence), are widely acknowledged as
equally powerful factors. Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. and
Major Linell A. Letendre, career JAG lawyers themselves, explained the
institutional culture this way:
102. Robert S. Bennett, Ethics, Zealous Advocacy, and the Criminal Defense
Attorney, CARDoZO LIFE (Winter 2001), at 27, available at http://bit.ly/Ro3MQA.
103. Spaulding, supra note 99, at 7-8.
104. Others have surmised that JAG "mission creep," or the expanding functions JAG
lawyers have provided the military in recent years (from running elections and approving
bomb targets to writing contracts for construction projects and compensating injured
civilians) actually signals a "thickening" identity on the part of the JAG Corps, in which
their identity is becoming more closely tied to the military. Elizabeth L. Hilleman,
Mission Creep in Military Lawyering, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 565, 568 (2011). This
trend may pose a concern for JAG professional independence, as JAG lawyers may
become more closely tied to a military identity and more distanced from a rule-of-law or
legal identity. On the other hand, JAG lawyers who play an expanded role and are forced
to defend the rule of law against military commanders in a multiplicity of circumstances
may become more devoted to their institutional identity as rule-of-law defenders.
105. See Luban, supra note 11, at 2000, 2005.
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For JAGs, candid counsel goes beyond our ethical obligation of
communicating candid advice to our clients; it is, quite simply, part
of our mission. Valor requires JAGs to act affirmatively on issues,
report and handle misconduct, deliver bad news, and, where
appropriate, disagree with one's superior. Quite notably, the ability
of JAGs to deliver candid and independent counsel is preserved by
statute.
0 6
It is this institutional commitment to truth telling and candor that has
inspired such a visceral reaction among the JAG lawyers to the
significant ethical challenges resultant from the political nature of the
military commission system. 107
Given JAG lawyers' clear position in a military command structure,
some scholars have speculated that this ethical high-mindedness would
give way when in tension with the wishes of a superior officer. 108 While
others have disputed that a "divided loyalty" problem exists for JAG
lawyers,' 0 9 most argue that a divided loyalty problem exists, but that
somehow it has not noticeably altered the lawyering seen in the military
commission system. "0 The fact that this divided loyalty problem has not
played a visible role in the commissions may be due to some extent to
the opacity of commission proceedings,"' but clearly also is due to the
strong JAG institutional identity, which inculcates in its lawyers strong,
even dogged, adherence to the rule of law and ethical lawyering.
Although a JAG lawyer may differ in the degree to which he or she self-
identifies as an officer versus a lawyer, and this variance may impact the
degree to which JAG lawyers prioritize the rule of law over the chain of
106. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. & Linell A. Letendre, Military Lawyering and
Professional Independence in the War on Terror: A Response to David Luban, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 417 (2008) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 8037(F) (2000)).
107. Cf. Dickinson, supra note 91, at 14 (recounting the results of her 2010 empirical
study of the JAG corps as demonstrating that the JAG culture is one of "a military
committed to the law of war and the fair treatment of detainees"); see also David Luban,
The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L.R. 1, 15 (2010).
108. Frakt, supra note 90, as 559-60 (2011) (citing commentary from Matthew Ivey,
David Luban, and Erwin Chemerinsky).
109. Frakt, supra note 90, at 563 ("Military defense counsel assigned to defend
detainees before the military commissions felt no divided loyalties.").
110. See, e.g., Ivey, supra note 11, at 238-39; Luban, supra note 11, at 2004; Erwin
Chemerinsky, Navy Is Wrong to Force out Guantanamo Lawyer, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 23,
2006.
111. Even with the Office of Chief Prosecutor's new policy of broadcasting GTMO
hearings, because so much commission lawyering occurs behind closed doors and
involves classified information, the fact that a phenomenon has not been "noticed" is not
evidence that it does not exist.
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military command,' 12 the most-told stories of the military commissions
have been of brave JAG assertions of professional independence.
Virtually every seasoned JAG lawyer has a story about the time he
or she was called upon to "buck the system," to risk professional
promotion for the sake of defending an undesirable defendant or giving
unwanted rule-of-law advice on the battlefield. Interestingly, some
proudly acknowledge that they did face negative career consequences as
a result of their ethically-correct choice.' 3  For a distressingly high
number of JAG participants in the commission system, their work on the
military commissions is that story. That the commissions require
lawyers to risk negative career consequences is problematic and
troubling, as it speaks to the politicization of the system and the subtle
command influence that may be present. More troubling, however, is the
fact that even the JAG Corps' powerful institutional identity cannot
guarantee that every lawyer faced with this challenge will respond by
choosing the moral high ground, regardless of the professional
consequences. The prevalence of these significant ethical challenges in
the commission system makes conviction more likely in the military
commissions than in other forums for reasons that have nothing to do
with the guilt or innocence of the accused.
112. In a survey of several hundred in-house corporate counsel, researchers
determined that these lawyers' legal and ethical decision-making was often a function of
which identity, either as an employee of the corporation ("organizational" identity) or as a
lawyer ("professional" identity), they viewed as more salient. Robertson, supra note 93,
at 13-14 (citing Hugh Gunz & Sally Gunz, Hired Professional to Hired Gun: An Identity
Theory Approach to Understanding the Ethical Behaviour of Professionals in Non-
Professional Organizations, 60 HuM. REL. 851, 859 (2007)). Like in-house corporate
counsel, JAG lawyers' decision-making may vary based on which of their dual
identities-as a military officer or as a lawyer-predominates. Accordingly, one might
expect JAG counsel whose "professional" identity as a lawyer is most salient to engage in
the type of come-what-may aggressive advocacy demonstrated by many commission
defense lawyers. One has to wonder, however, how those lawyers whose
"organizational" identity is most salient-whose strongest identity is as an officer rather
than as a lawyer-may respond to the unique pressures of operating within a politicized
military hierarchy. For instance, would a prosecutor whose salient identity is an
organizational one respond with indignation, as Morris Davis did, to the close supervision
of the Convening Authority's Legal Advisor, or would he or she prioritize the judgment
of superior officers, despite the prosecutorial independence suggested by the MCA?
Given the inappropriateness of political forces dictating criminal justice outcomes, or of
the criminal justice system's use for political purposes, a salient "professional" identity
would seem to be most desirable for counterbalancing the opacity and potential
manipulation of the commission system.
113. See generally Frakt, supra note 90.
[Vol. 117:2
2012] GUANTANAMO BAY AND THE CONFLICT OF ETHICAL LAWYERING 313
B. Ethical Challenges of the Office of the Chief Prosecutor
Prosecutors in every system operate under regular ethical pressure,
but the commission system amplifies these pressures to a degree beyond
that seen in other criminal justice systems. Extensive scholarship exists
regarding the prosecutor's role in the criminal justice system, most
frequently centering on the obligation to serve as a "minister of
justice.""' 4 The American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section,
Standard 3-1.2 (c) explains: "The duty of a prosecutor is to seek justice,
not merely to convict."'" 15  U.S. Supreme Court Justice George
Sutherland highlighted this dual prosecutorial role in 1935:
[The prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of
the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is
to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.116
Balancing prosecutorial zeal with a commitment to justice is a
constant challenge for prosecutors in any system. In the commission
system, the challenges of this balancing act are significantly amplified by
the nature of the crimes committed, the institutional framework of the
individuals prosecuting the cases, the asymmetry of information-
gathering, the heavy historic politicization of the system, and the high
profile of the cases. Unlike the usual criminal case, where the victim or
victims are individuals unknown to the prosecutor, terrorist crimes are
directed against the United States, which the prosecutor has sworn to
protect and defend, and against its citizens, a group to which the
prosecutor belongs. Military prosecutors, who have taken an oath to
defend their country against such violence, and many of whom have
witnessed terrorist attacks firsthand on the battlefields of Afghanistan or
Iraq, might feel the personal nature of terrorist crimes even more keenly.
Balanced against this personal stake in terrorism prosecution, of
course, is the JAG lawyers' ethically centered institutional identity. JAG
114. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 132 (2004) ("The primary
responsibility of prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished."); Judith A. Goldberg
& David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving
Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389, 393 (2002) ("No ethical
prosecutor should ever oppose the pursuit of justice ... ").
115. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
3-1.2 (c) (3d ed. 1993).
116. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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prosecutors have been vigorous defenders of rule-of-law protections for
terrorist suspects, as evidenced by the public resignations and statements
of commission prosecutors like Morris Davis, Darrel Vandeveld, and
Stuart Couch."17 Some of the heightened ethical pressures JAG lawyers
experience in the commissions are a function of their military
membership, but other challenges are felt equally strongly by their
civilian colleagues in the Office of the Chief Prosecutor. For this latter
category of challenge, the JAG Corps serves, to some extent, as the
canary in the mine-a warning of a toxic ethical environment apparent
only because of the JAGs' heightened sensitivity to rule-of-law
deviations.
1. The Problem of Prosecutorial Volunteerism
The ethical challenges inherent in terrorist prosecution have been
compounded in the commission context by reliance on volunteers to fill
the pool of prosecutors." 8 Some JAG prosecutors have volunteered for
this duty because of close personal connections to victims of terrorism
and, therefore, a personal connection to prosecution efforts. For
instance, former JAG prosecutor Stuart Couch lost a close friend in the
September 1 1th attacks-a Marine buddy who had co-piloted one of the
flights that hit the World Trade Center." 19 Couch volunteered to serve on
the prosecution because he wanted to "get a crack at the guys who
attacked the United States"12°-a sentiment which does not exactly
evoke a "minister of justice" mindset. Likewise, for JAG lawyers who
spent time in combat in Afghanistan or Iraq, who may have fought
against insurgents or lost colleagues to insurgent or terrorist attacks, the
goal of terrorist conviction may seem synonymous with the goal of
pursuing justice. 12 1 Self-selection within the prosecution team and its
117. See Josh Meyer, For Lawyer, Trial Was Tribulation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008,
available at http://lat.ms/ij6Xj9 (referencing Darrel Vandeveld's resignation as, at
minimum, the fourth resignation of a prosecutor in protest of the military commission
system).
118. See David J.R. Frakt, Closing Argument at Guantanamo: The Torture of
Mohammed Jawad, 22 HARV. HUM. Rrs. J. 401, 404 (2009) (referencing the Armed
Services' request for each branch to solicit JAG officers to serve on the commissions and
the Air Force's resultant request for volunteers).
119. See Jess Bravin, The Conscience of the Colonel, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2007,
available at http://bit.ly/QsNao3.
120. Id.
121. As former commission prosecutor Darrel Vandeveld explained, when he joined
the commission, it was "to further [his] desire for revenge for the September 2001
attacks, and to avenge those Americans who had not survived their tours of duty," a goal
which he saw as "protecting and defending the Constitution and our Nation, as well as
contributing in some small measure to ensure that the fallen had not done so in vain."
[Vol. 117:2
2012] GUANTANAMO BAY AND THE CONFLICT OF ETHICAL LAWYERING 315
attendant personal commitment to punishing terrorists has a tendency to
bring with it a bias, a "thick identity,"'' 22 which makes maintaining the
evenhanded, open-minded "minister of justice" role more challenging.
Where, as in the commissions, the prosecutorial team is comprised of
volunteers from across the government (e.g., the Justice Department's
National Security Division (NSD), Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Attorneys' offices, and the DOD), all of whom share similar incentives
and predispositions in favor of conviction, these personally-invested
prosecutors may operate under the perception that the team reflects
diverse neutral perspectives when, in fact, all share the same bias in favor
of conviction.
12 3
JAG lawyers' institutional commitments to the rule of law may
make them better suited for such ethical predicaments. Commission
prosecutor Stuart Couch, as discussed infra, made a brave ethical choice
to resign from a case notwithstanding his professed interest in terrorist
conviction. Couch's description of the soul-wrenching decision-making
process he went through-weeks of sleeplessness, depression, anxiety,
and consultation with a religious authority-leaves no doubt that there
are significant ethical challenges for commission prosecutors in fulfilling
their "minister of justice" role and potentially increased challenges when
a personal interest is at stake. 24  Fortunately, JAG prosecutors often
naturally gravitate toward the "minister of justice" ideal due to previous
Interview with Darrel Vandeveld, THE MODERATE VOICE, Feb. 21, 2009,
http://bit.ly/Rj563H.
122. Spaulding, supra note 99, at 23-27.
123. See Medwed, supra note 114, at 132; see also Frakt, supra note 11, at 87
("[B]ecause the Office of Military Commissions relied in large part on volunteers to fill
the ranks of the prosecution and defense, quite a few of the defense counsel and
prosecutors were not only personally committed to their cases or clients, but also they
were often philosophically and ideologically committed to the positions they were
advocating"). See generally Robertson, supra note 93, at 7-9 (discussing the impact of
"partisanship"--being assigned to advocate for a particular side---on an individual's
perception of reality and observing that often it results in selective attention to facts
advantageous to the designated side). While it is not unusual for Article III prosecutions
to be performed by a collaborative group of Justice Department lawyers (often joining
NSD lawyers with Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) from the district where the charges
have been brought), these lawyers largely are not "volunteers" in the same sense that they
are in the commission system: they may have chosen a career with Justice, but they
generally have not volunteered for a specific type of prosecution. Obviously, NSD
lawyers have chosen a career in counter-terrorism work, but they typically are assigned to
specific assignments not by their own choice but by the decision of their superiors based
on their skill set, workload, and experience. The AUSAs are assigned using those same
considerations and by virtue of their employment in the particular district in which the
case was filed. While some small degree of self-selection may be involved in terms of
who is assigned to which case, by-and-large assignment to a specific type of case is not
self-initiated, thereby mitigating the risk of the conviction-focused tunnel vision that
might otherwise accompany a largely volunteer prosecutorial team.
124. See Bravin, supra note 119.
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experience as defense counsel, experience that allows them to review
evidence and enforce the law in a way less likely to be tied to a strong
prosecutorial identity and more likely to be objective. Similarly, JAG
prosecutors share natural bonds with opposing JAG counsel through their
common institutional identity and JAG experience and, occasionally,
shared military service.
125
In addition, while JAG lawyers certainly stand to gain
professionally by obtaining a conviction, the professional benefits of a
military commission win are far less significant for a JAG attorney than
for a DOJ lawyer, for whom it may provide a platform for professional
advancement or political appointment. As veteran JAG lawyer David
Frakt described the military promotion system: "Promotions ...are
largely based on leadership ability, as reflected in officer performance
reports, rather than on performance or skill as an attorney.' ' 126  An
important prosecutorial victory will receive a mention in a JAG lawyer's
promotion report, but it is a far less significant consideration in
determining promotion or future assignment than the type of leadership
experience one would receive in a lower-profile alternative post. 127 In
other words, a stunningly successful prosecution in the military
commission system is not likely to be a career maker in the way that it
could be for an Assistant U.S. Attorney. 1
28
C. Ethical Challenges in Applying the Brady Framework in the
Commission System
Prosecutors in all criminal justice systems face ethical challenges in
determining how best to comply with the constitutional disclosure
requirements imposed by the Supreme Court's Brady129 line of cases, but
even more so in the military commissions. 30  Determining what
125. In Hamdan, prosecution and defense counsel had served together as JAGs in the
field and maintained their close friendship and cooperation throughout the Hamdan trial.
Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/2, supra note 44.
126. See David Frakt, Winning Detainee Hamdan's Case Didn't Prevent Navy
Lawyer's Promotion, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 7, 2006.
127. Id.
128. Indeed, because the military prizes leadership experience over litigation
experience, a victory in the commission system, where proceedings often extend over
years, would require multiple consecutive litigation tours and, therefore, would be more
likely to damage, rather than enhance, promotion prospects.
129. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
130. See id. ("We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution."). Although, in the early days of the military commissions, it was not clear
whether the Brady disclosure rule applied in the military commissions, the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 erased that confusion. See Vandeveld Decl. 1, supra note 82,
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evidence qualifies as "exculpatory" and warrants disclosure on that basis
comes with a host of practical challenges. Because only "material,"
exculpatory information need be disclosed by the prosecution,
prosecutors are required to make an independent determination regarding
the materiality of the evidence in their possession. 131 This determination
is far from intuitive and requires prosecutors to stand in the shoes of an
appellate court-often well before trial strategy is set-and weigh the
importance of the evidence, the strength of the rest of their case, and
other sources of evidence available to and used by the defense.
132
Indeed, prosecutors are required to apply the Brady standard
prospectively. Under the law, prosecutors must disclose exculpatory
evidence in a "timely manner," which requires them to assess the
strength of their case and the importance of the particular piece of
evidence before their investigation is complete, before all evidence is in
hand, before receiving evidentiary rulings that will determine the scope
of the evidence they may use, and before trial reveals the defense
strategy to which they may need to tailor their case. 133
In the commission system, standing in the shoes of an appellate
body-particularly in the early stages of a commission proceeding-
presents an incredible challenge. The commission system requires
application of an entirely new set of untried hearsay rules-rules with no
precedent to guide prosecutorial decision-making. Moreover, by statute,
the commission system has no precedent at all-other than the handful of
previous military commission opinions-for prosecutors to use in
assessing whether evidence will be admissible. 134 Where intelligence
agencies collect the majority of evidence in a case, this already difficult
task is made all the more onerous. Intelligence agencies are notoriously
reluctant to supply evidence to prosecutors for use in criminal
processes'3 5 and have been known to withhold from military commission
prosecutors material details regarding, for instance, the interrogation
procedures used to elicit evidence that formed the basis of the
5 (noting the Convening Authority's refusal to authorize the defense to have an
independent physician review Jawad's health records).
131. See Daniel Medwed, Brady's Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533,
1541 (2010).
132. See id.; see also DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA'S RACE
TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012).
133. Id. at 1542.
134. See 10 USC § 948b(b)-(c) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
135. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 90-91 (2007) (noting intelligence agencies' risk aversion and
occasional resistance to White House orders due to their fear of "retroactive discipline,"
which is after-the-fact punishment for actions they were instructed to take).
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commission charges.136 Because the method of obtaining the information
may play a major role in determining its admissibility (e.g., what types of
interrogation methods elicited the evidence), this withholding of
information makes a Brady determination challenging on a few levels:
first, this type of information almost certainly would qualify as
exculpatory; second, this lack of full information regarding sources and
methods (and therefore admissibility) may leave prosecutors without an
accurate sense of what their case ultimately will be, and therefore what
evidence meets the definition of "exculpatory." As former commission
prosecutor Darrel Vandeveld recalled, at the time charges were sworn
against commission defendant Mohammed Jawad, the prosecution had
"absolutely no idea" Jawad had been subjected to abusive treatment of
any kind-the records in their custody showed no evidence of injury.137
Only later did they discover that Jawad had been subjected to highly
abusive treatment while in both Afghan and U.S. custody, including
administration of the "frequent flyer" program.' 38  Where information
regarding collection processes and interrogation techniques has been
withheld from commission prosecutors, the prosecutors must make
decisions regarding disclosure with a much-reduced sense of the scope of
evidence they may ultimately use in their case or the admissibility of that
evidence.
This concern is present in any terrorism/national security case but
becomes amplified in the military commission setting, where judges
historically have been reticent to question the government's classification
determinations or to force it to share evidence with the defense. 139 The
136. See Marie Brenner, Taking on Guantanamo, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 2007), available
at http://vnty.fr/OZjVwZ (discussing former defense counsel Swift's recollection that, in
the early days of the commissions, several of the prosecutors who were frustrated at
having been denied evidence by the CIA during discovery had confided to him that "the
C.I.A. has taken this over," and that despite their best efforts, it was difficult to get
evidence out of the intelligence agencies). See generally Decl. of Lt. Col. Darrel J.
Vandeveld, United States v. Jawad, CMCR No. 08-004 (Mil. Comm'n Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Vandeveld Decl. 2], (describing prosecutor's
"[H]erculean" effort to secure all relevant evidence in Mohammed Jawad case), available
at http://bit.ly/QsU3pd.
137. See Vandeveld Decl. 2, supra note 136, 11.
138. See id. The "frequent flyer" program refers to the subjection of detainees in U.S.
military custody to extreme sleep deprivation, typically in conjunction with interrogation.
See Jamil Dakwar, Guantanamo's Frequent Flyer Program, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS
(June 20, 2008, 4:45 PM), http://bit.ly/TIJiUE.
139. See NAT'L INST. MIL. JUST., REPORTS FROM GUANTANAMO VOLUME I, at 5 (report
of Jonathan Tracey), available at http://bit.ly/TIJXoZ [hereinafter GUANTANAMO
REPORTS III] (noting that "the defense had to fight for every piece of evidence and rarely
won all the evidence it was entitled to receive"). Broad judicial deference to government
decisions regarding classification can be crippling to the defense because such
determinations often limit the defense's ability to discuss evidence and strategy with their
clients, deprive them of direct access to documents and witnesses, and require them to
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concern is also amplified where new, relatively untried military
commission rules of evidence leave looming questions over what
evidence ultimately will be admissible. 140 These factors combine both to
allow prosecutors broad discretion with regard to evidentiary disclosure
and to severely limit the information they have available when making
that determination. The objectivity of commission judges has been
widely criticized by defense counsel and others, who allege that the
commission judiciary too often defers to the prosecution. 14 1  Indeed,
under the MCA, commission judges essentially are commanded to be
highly deferential to the government regarding what evidence may be
shared with defense counsel and under what circumstances. 142  These
decisions are potentially game changing, such as whether evidentiary
summaries produced by the government to replace classified exculpatory
evidence or witness testimony are sufficient, or whether defense counsel
can question specific witnesses or view specific documents.
1 43
This pressure to side with the government is magnified by the fact
that military judges typically have little experience with the type of high-
volume classified information management required in a commission
apprise the prosecution in advance any time they seek to use classified information in
court, which often forces advance disclosure of trial strategy and legal arguments. See
Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/13, supra note 57. According to Judge Leonie Brinkema, who
tried the Zacarias Moussaoui case, judicial oversight is particularly important given the
government's penchant for keeping evidence classified to avoid embarrassment rather
than for national security purposes. See Doug Kramer, Federal Judge Says Courts Can
Handle Gitmo Cases, CLEVELAND NEWS (Apr. 2, 2009, 11:06 PM), http://bit.ly/UYlbeO.
140. See Vladeck, supra note 6.
141. Complaints by the Chief Defense Counsel's Office of lack of impartiality among
judges include complaints that military judges (1) allow prosecutors to set the agenda for
the hearings, often letting the prosecution to argue motions that the court has expressly
told defense counsel would not be discussed in the proceeding and (2) give the
government the benefit of every possible evidentiary ruling, particularly when
classification is even tangentially involved. See Pet. for Writ of Mandamus and Writ of
Prohibition at 19-20, In re Al Shibh, No. 09-1238 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 2009). Other groups
have also observed a pro-prosecution bias. A former JAG observer from the National
Institute of Military Justice noted that "the defense had to fight for every piece of
evidence and rarely won all the evidence it was entitled to receive." GUANTANAMO
REPORTS III, supra note 139, at 5.
142. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing differences in judicial role under CIPA versus
MCA).
143. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing differences in judicial role under CIPA versus
MCA); see also JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31600, THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS: ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL RULES AND
COMPARISON WITH PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
15-16 (2006) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 950w); United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455, 2003
WL 2123699 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003) (requiring the prosecution to allow standby
defense counsel access to GTMO detainee witnesses or risk exclusion of that testimony);
Amos N. Guiora, Creating a Domestic Terror Court, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 617, 621 (2009)
(describing classification decisions made by Eastern District of Virginia Judge Leonie
Brinkema in the Zacarias Moussaoui case as "highly problematic").
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proceeding, as these types of cases are rare in courts-martial. Likewise,
because military commission judges are tasked with ruling on
international and constitutional law issues of first impression (issues to
which courts-martial judging provides little exposure), reviewing
hundreds of pages of briefing, and performing these tasks under the
watchful eye of the media, it is not surprising that these judges would err
on the side of the government. This government-leaning tendency is
particularly likely where these rule-of-law-minded JAG officers are
forced to wade through uncharted legal territory, unmoored from the
guidance of rules and precedent to which they are accustomed and in a
system where there effectively is no precedent.'" As with judges in the
courts-martial system, judges in the commission system serve without set
terms and with few institutional protections.145 This lack of institutional
protection is problematic in the military commission system, however,
where political forces are prevalent and where judges may consider
themselves closely watched. 146 Given these pressures, it would not be
surprising if military judges (consciously or not) tended to err on the side
of jurisprudential caution by ruling in ways that advance conviction over
acquittal. 147 Regardless of whether commission judges in fact defer to
144. See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(c) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
145. See Major Fansu Ku, From Law Member to Military Judge: The Continuing
Evolution of an Independent Trial Judiciary in the Twenty-First Century, 199 MIL. L.
REv. 49, 57 (2009). The Military Commissions Act prohibits, as does the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, the review of any judge by the Convening Authority or his staff with
regard to that judge's performance of duty as a military judge. See 10 U.S.C. § 948j(h)
(2006 & Supp. 2009); see also UCMJ art. 26(a) (2012). Without life tenure or a fixed
term, however, while the review prohibition prevents a military judge from being
removed from his post expressly because of a ruling, in practice, a military judge lacks
real substantive insulation from removal so long as that removal can be justified on other
grounds. See DOD, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, at 11-12 (2010) (stating that
the Convening Authority may, under Military Commission Rule 109, refer a military
judge for professional discipline). Perhaps tellingly, unlike the UCMJ, the MCA does not
require the President to prescribe procedures governing the investigation and disposition
of matters concerning the fitness of military judges. See UCMJ art. 6(a) (2012).
146. When Commission Judge Army Colonel Peter Brownback retired suddenly,
some speculated that he was forcibly retired because of a controversial ruling in the al
Bahlul case (granting al Bahlul's pro se request) or because he threatened prosecutors
with suspending proceedings against Omar Khadr unless they produced records related to
the conditions of his confinement. Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/7, supra note 48; see also
Khadr Judge Fired, Says His Military Lawyer, CBC NEWS (May 29, 2008, 10:05 PM),
http://bit.ly/UY5OQm. While the reason for Brownback's forcible retirement was never
made public, the timing of the decision was sufficiently coincidental, immediate, and
unexplained that it engendered widespread speculation. Certainly, at the least, the nature
of his removal is enough to cause other military judges to consider carefully rulings that
are potentially controversial.
147. Harvard Law Professor Bill Stuntz observed federal judges' aversion to risk-
taking with regard to reversal and the resultant conservative management of discovery
and trial. See William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and
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the government more often than do federal judges, commission lawyers'
perception that commission judges favor the prosecution may affect
prosecutorial decision-making in any event, as the risk of facing serious
consequences for failing to make Brady disclosures or engaging in
gratuitous classification may be perceived as low.
These complicating factors, along with intelligence agencies that are
empowered by court deference and unclear admissibility rules, make the
military commission prosecutor's task of ensuring Brady compliance
even more challenging than it is in civilian criminal courts. 148 The task is
sufficiently daunting that commission prosecutors effectively are
discouraged from engaging in the type of Brady review conducted in
civilian or courts-martial proceedings, since repeated requests for
evidence are likely to bear little fruit.
149
The incentive to under-disclose in the military commission context
is bolstered by the low likelihood of independent discovery of Brady
materials by the defense. Prosecutors, as a general matter, engage in
Brady deliberations without supervision or review, performing these
important and often consequential constitutional analyses without public
disclosure. 50  In military commission cases, prosecutors have little
reason to worry that defense counsel might independently stumble across
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 13-16 (1997). Of course, while the safe course for
federal judges with regard to reversal and public opinion is to allow the utmost in
criminal procedure protection, see id, for military judges, the safe course with regard to
reversal and public opinion generally is to rule in favor of the government.
148. The challenges faced by military commission lawyers in the Brady context are
further complicated by the overlay of state ethical responsibilities with which they must
comply to maintain good standing with their state bar associations. Many states have
added additional layers of protection to the obligations identified in Brady and its
progeny, embedding more stringent disclosure requirements in their ethical rules, which
are binding on JAG lawyers in those state jurisdictions while in practice before the
military commissions. See Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their
Disclosure Obligations: Can Prosecutors' Offices Learn from Their Lawyers'Mistakes?,
31 CARDozo L. REv. 2161, 2165 (2010); R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS
70-71 (2005) ("[T]he use of the term 'tends' in Rule 3.8(d) and its predecessor, ABA
Model Code provision DR 7-103(b), was likely intended to suggest a broader disclosure
obligation than the 'materially exculpatory evidence' standard of Brady and its
progeny.").
149. See Vandeveld Decl. 2, supra note 136, 8 (noting complete lack of
organization of commission investigation files).
150. As Professor Daniel Medwed observed, "When a prosecutor chooses not to
disclose evidence, that decision is seldom revealed to outsiders unless he later has a
change of heart or it somehow finds its way into defense hands." Medwed, supra note
114, at 1542 (citing Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games
Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 537 (2007) (listing various ways
undisclosed evidence may be discovered, including Freedom of Information Act requests,
independent investigation by defendants or their relatives, discovery during post-trial
motion hearings, and by chance).
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withheld evidence15' or that a military judge may order production of
exculpatory evidence improperly identified as classified and produced in
summary form. The crimes alleged largely took place on faraway
battlefields located in remote, dangerous regions-crime scenes which
may be inaccessible to the defense because of national security concerns
or resource limitations and, even if accessible, have been compromised
by the passage of time and wartime damage. Intelligence agencies have
gathered virtually all of the evidence against the defendants through
interrogations of the defendants, other detainees, and intelligence assets,
and this evidence is classified; therefore, it is beyond the reach of
defense investigators. 15 2 The independent discovery problem is also seen
in federal courts (e.g., in United States v. Ghailanil5 3), but is exacerbated
in the commission system by judicial deference and severely limited
defense funding.' 54  Each of these hurdles for defense counsel make
independent discovery of Brady materials highly unlikely, thus providing
no counterweight to the natural incentives of a prosecutor to withhold
Brady evidence. 55 Accordingly, commission prosecutors may be more
likely to err on the side of caution in withholding potentially exculpatory
evidence.
151. Prosecutors have had such a difficult time gathering evidence from intelligence
agencies and, with the disorganization of the files they do receive, even the most
dedicated of prosecutors cannot guarantee that all exculpatory evidence has been
disclosed. Commission prosecutor Darrell Vandeveld infamously stumbled across a key
piece of exculpatory evidence against commission defendant Mohammed Jawad in a
random locker at GTMO. See Vandeveld Decl. 2, supra note 136, 8, 25. Vandeveld's
lack of confidence in his ability to guarantee compliance with Brady obligations, among
other concerns about the fairness of the military commission system, ultimately led him
to resign from his commission post. See id. 29.
152. In the pending cases against the alleged 9/11 co-conspirators, the government
has classified statements that the defendants made to government interrogators prior to
being represented by counsel. See Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/13, supra note 57.
However, military commission defense counsel are prohibited from communicating with
their clients regarding statements those clients have made to interrogators, further
limiting defense counsel's ability to investigate that evidence. See id.
153. United States v. Ghailani, 761 F. Supp. 2d 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
154. Even assuming the defense independently located undisclosed Brady evidence,
the odds of success in bringing a Brady claim in federal court historically have been
remarkably low. Defendants likely would face similarly long odds in the commission
system. See Medwed, supra note 114, at 1543 ("When Brady issues do come to light, the
materiality test is a heavy burden for a defendant to overcome on appeal. Appellate
courts are frugal in doling out Brady reversals.").
155. See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor's Office,
31 CARDozo L. REv. 2090, 2091-92 (2010) (discussing incentives for prosecutorial Brady
violations).
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1. Professional Disincentives for Raising Ethical Challenges
While many deride the ideal of the upright, impartial prosecutor as a
fanciful notion' 5 6 -particularly given the challenges inherent in a
terrorist trial-it is just this type of commitment to the rule of law that
has played out in the Office of the Chief Prosecutor over the past ten
years. Although one could argue that the brave actions of these
principled prosecutors should serve to reinforce public confidence in the
military commission system, the reality is that the remarkably high
number of these resignations in such a short time period is compelling
evidence of a troubled system. There have been no institutional reforms
that would remedy these types of ethical challenges. The fact that this
type of ethical bravery was required of so many-and the fact that, for
every courageous prosecutor whose actions are lauded in the press, there
may well be others making less courageous choices that are far less
publicized or perhaps undiscoverable157-raises real concerns about the
legitimacy of the commission system going forward.
In its relatively short history, the commission system has seen seven
prosecutors-including two Chief Prosecutors-resign from specific
cases, the commission system, or the service entirely because of
perceived ethical improprieties tied to the commissions.' 5 It is no
surprise that the vast majority of these lawyers have been JAG officers
with long histories in the courts-martial system, a criminal justice system
which has come to be generally viewed as insulated from political
pressure. 159 When confronted by political pressure to obtain convictions
at any cost, to use evidence obtained through torture, to bring cases
without merit or prematurely, or upon discovering that relevant
exculpatory information would never be produced, these prosecutors
156. See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 792-94 (2000)
(discussing the public interest serving mission of prosecutors); Kenneth Bresler, Pretty
Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1301-02 (1996) (observing that the phrase "minister of justice" is
largely a platitude without genuine implications for prosecutorial conduct).
157. See, e.g., Vandeveld Decl. 2, supra note 136, 22 (recounting astonishment at
witnessing his putative superior, Chief Prosecutor Colonel Lawrence Morris, allow
Brigadier General Hartmann to give technically correct, but not fully candid, answers to
questions in a hearing regarding Hartmann's alleged unlawful influence in the dawad
case).
158. Daniel Schulman, Is the Army Forcing Out a Gitmo Whistleblower?, MOTHER
JONES (May 31, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://bit.ly/aNTZLI (referencing Morris Davis and
Fred Borch).
159. David J.R. Frakt, Indelicate Imbalance: A Critical Comparison of the Rules and
Procedures for Military Commissions and Courts-Martial, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 315
(2007).
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made the difficult decision to take an ethical stand. 160  The decisions
made by these individuals to resign from the commission system were
fraught with self-doubt and emotional hardship and, for several, lasting
professional consequences. As Darrell Vandeveld recalled of former
Chief Prosecutor Morris Davis, "There is no doubt on the part of those
who know him, that Col. Davis would have been elevated to the rank of
general officer had he not refused to be bullied by members of the [Bush]
Administration ... ,,161 Rather than receiving a promotion, Davis was
notified that he had "not serve[d] honorably" in the commissions because
of his resignation, and he was denied a medal for his service as
prosecutor. 162
Moreover, JAG prosecutors who choose to defend their "minister of
justice" role may risk the social stigma of refusing to prosecute cases
their colleagues-and in some cases senior officers-view as completely
valid. Stuart Couch recounted his experience of telling then-Chief
Prosecutor and senior officer Army Colonel Bob Swann that he would
not prosecute an assigned case for moral and legal reasons (all useable
evidence was a product of torture). Swann's response was swift,
personal, and indignant: "What makes you think you're so much better
than the rest of us around here?"' 163 Couch is quick to point out that he
suffered no career setback as a result of his decision. Indeed, he
continued as a commission prosecutor on his other assigned cases.
164
While Couch may have paid only a collegial price, others, like Morris
Davis, were not so lucky. 165 All of these individuals, however, were
forced to make potentially career-ending decisions in choosing whether
to follow the course they viewed as the ethical one.
160. This is true even of individuals who had full conviction in the guilt of at least
some of the potential defendants. Colonel Morris Davis, former Chief Prosecutor and
current harsh Guantanamo critic who resigned his post due in part to the efforts of the
DOD to dictate what cases he proceeded on first, has stated that with respect to "seventy-
five or eighty [detainees,]" he believed there was "reliable evidence to prove they had
violated the law of war in the past." Fmr. Chief Guantanamo Prosecutor Says Military
Commissions "Not Justice," DEMOCRACY Now! (July 16, 2008), http://bit.ly/dvJusJ
(interviewing Colonel Morris Davis, former Chief Prosecutor, Office of Military
Commissions).
161. The Talking Dog, TD Blog Interview with Darrel Vandeveld, THE TALKING DOG
(Feb. 20, 2009), http://bit.ly/TgMGAX.
162. See McNeal, supra note 68, at 133 (citing Josh White, Colonel Says Speaking
Out Cost a Medal, WASH. POST, May 29, 2008, at A09).
163. See Bravin, supra note 119.
164. See id.
165. See, e.g., McNeal, supra note 68, at 133 (recounting Former Chief Prosecutor
Morris Davis's allegations of retaliation); Vandeveld Decl. 1, supra note 82, 12
(observing official retaliation against former prosecutors Morris Davis and William
Britt).
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Regardless of whether official retaliation occurred against those
prosecutors who spoke out or was merely perceived by some, the
existence of these allegations of retaliation and the known possibility of
it ensures that professional risk will be a consideration for JAG
prosecutors going forward. The perceived risk will impact commission
lawyering, increasing the likelihood of less ethical conduct. Given the
difficulty of the ethical decisions faced by commission lawyers, their
frequency, and the incredible courage required in following the most
principled course, it is likely that for every prosecutor who refused to
proceed with a prosecution, others did so despite misgivings. 66 For
instance, former prosecutor Darrel Vandeveld described the professional
dangers associated with trying to perform his prosecutorial ethical
obligation to pursue justice, 167 admitting that he had previously declined
to share certain exculpatory evidence with commission defense counsel
out of concern for retaliation if seen to be too cooperative with the
defense, a choice justified in his mind by the hope that he might improve
the system from within by continuing to participate. 168 Despite the
courageous lawyering exhibited to date by the JAG Corps, it would be
naYve to believe that every JAG lawyer would, under the circumstances
present in the commissions, place a client's interest before his own; the
fact that the commissions requires as much raises questions about the
system's legitimacy.
Prosecutors in every criminal justice system struggle to balance
complying with the rules of professional responsibility, their individual
sense of justice and propriety, and the aggressive pursuit of conviction.
Prosecutors in every criminal justice system also struggle with the
professional consequences of such decision-making.' 69 Nevertheless, the
Office of Chief Prosecutor faces conflicting ethical pressures greater than
the pressure faced by prosecutors in a standard court-martial or Article
III court. Reasons for such heightened pressure include: (1) the national
security interests at stake in trying terrorist suspects, (2) the close public
166. While the decision to risk professional reputation by resigning from the
commission or a particular case would be difficult regardless of one's formal military
status, Couch's and Vandeveld's resolve may have been strengthened by their status as
military reservists, which are lawyers who have legal careers independent from the
military. Indeed, at the time Vandeveld served as prosecutor in the commission system,
it was not clear that Brady disclosure obligations applied to a commission prosecution.
Nevertheless, as a state prosecutor in his non-military career, Vandeveld felt duty bound
to comply with Brady requirements.
167. Vandeveld Decl. 1, supra note 82, 12.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 107 (referencing the story of veteran New York
prosecutor Daniel Bibb who was assigned to reexamine two murder convictions that he
came to believe were wrongful, but that his supervisors would not dismiss, ultimately
causing him to "d[o] the best I could ... [t]o lose" the cases in court).
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scrutiny felt by senior officials and the President regarding detainee
policy (and therefore by the lawyers executing it), and (3) the additional
pressure of being part of a command structure. Individuals like
Vandeveld and Couch risked their professional reputations and careers,
as well as (in the case of Couch) the conviction of individuals they
believed to be terrorists because, in their view, their ethical obligations
required it. As former Chief Prosecutor Morris Davis described his
commitment to the military commission process:
I was the chief prosecutor for the military commissions at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, until Oct. 4, the day I concluded that full,
fair and open trials were not possible under the current system. I
resigned on that day because I felt that the system had become deeply
politicized and that I could no longer do my job effectively or
responsibly. 170
Darrel Vandeveld explained his decision to resign in similar terms: "I
became the seventh military prosecutor at Guantanamo to resign because
I could not ethically or legally prosecute the defendant within the
military commission system at Guantanamo. '1 71 The JAG lawyers made
courageous ethical choices in service to their deep, institutional, rule-of-
law commitments, and the fact that they were forced to make such
choices attests to a challenging ethical environment. Despite the many
examples of moral courage and professional independence exhibited by
the JAG prosecutors at Guantanamo Bay, the regular and significant
ethical pressures they face call into question the functionality and
legitimacy of the commission system.
D. Ethical Challenges of the Office of the Chief Defense Counsel
JAG defense counsel have an impressive history of ethical
lawyering in the military commissions, regularly providing a full-
throated defense of the rule of law and their clients despite significant
ethical pressures. In the time-honored tradition of defense counsel, JAG
lawyers from the Office of the Chief Defense Counsel have been
required to adopt the role of zealous advocate notwithstanding potential
professional consequences for themselves. It is a role for which, as
discussed supra, JAG lawyers are institutionally well suited. 172 While
defense counsel in any criminal justice system grapple with difficult
170. Morris Davis, AWOL Military Justice, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at 15.
171. Testimony of Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld (USA Reserves): Hearing on Legal
Issues Surrounding the Military Commissions System Before the Subcomm. on
Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11 th
Cong. 19 (2009). '
172. See supra Part II.A.
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ethical questions regarding zeal, confidentiality, trust, and primacy of the
client's interest, particularly in high profile cases, 173 the ethical demands
placed on JAG defense counsel by the commission system have been
extraordinary. As one JAG defense recalled of his military commission
experience, "I practiced military law for fourteen years without ever
needing an ethics opinion. Here, I needed several of them before I ever
got a client.'
174
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has openly
discouraged its members from acting as civilian counsel at Guantanamo
Bay, noting that "[t]he rules regulating counsel's behavior are just too
restrictive to give us any confidence that counsel will be able to act
zealously and professionally.' ' 175 The Office of Chief Defense counsel
lawyers themselves have been deeply divided over the propriety of
working within the commission system, despite what they view as
embedded unfairness for their clients. By engaging in reform efforts,
they may improve the rights available to their clients, but in doing so
they also decrease the likelihood of reversal of their clients' convictions
on constitutional grounds. 176 The ethical challenges embedded in the
commission system repeatedly have required defense counsel to choose
between professional reputation and advancement on one hand and their
duty to their client on the other. JAG defense counsel have, to date,
engaged in remarkably zealous high-stakes advocacy on behalf of their
clients, despite serious obstacles, but their zealousness, commitment, and
success should not be grounds on which to ignore the very real ethical
challenges they have had to overcome. The fact that these principled
lawyers have been called upon to make such sacrifices for their clients
indicates an urgent need for reform. This reform is perhaps even more
urgent now, as capital punishment is being considered for the 9/11
173. See, e.g., Judith L. Maute, Colloquium: What Does It Mean to Practice Law "In
the Interests of Justice" in the Twenty-First Century?: "In Pursuit of Justice" in High
Profile Criminal Matters, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1745, 1748 (2002).
174. Luban, supra note 11, at 2007 (citing a telephone interview with a JAG defense
counsel on December 3, 2007).
175. Lawrence S. Goldman, Guantanamo: Little Hope for Zealous Advocacy,
CHAMPION MAG., at 4 (July 2003), available at http://bit.ly/TMdOgj.
176. The Office of Chief Defense Counsel has been internally divided over whether"
its clients are best served by efforts to improve the commission process, or whether
participation in reforms adds legitimacy to a system that is fundamentally broken. The
Office ultimately decided to let defense counsel reach their own decisions on the issue.
See Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/7, supra note 48; Associated Press, Navy Lawyer Who
Faulted Guantanamo Is Reassigned, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, available at
http://nyti.ms/12XY9N (reporting Khadr defense counsel's statement faulting the Chief
Defense Counsel for cooperating with the Obama Administration in determining the
forum for trying detainee cases: "I don't want to make it easier for the government to
prosecute my client .... I want my client to be released.").
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conspirators and as an increasing number of civilian defense counsel
enter the commission system-lawyers who may so closely identify with
their adversarial role and the detainees' cause that the serious ethical
challenges inherent in commission lawyering become less perceptible.
177
1. Ethical Challenges in Operating Within a Chain of Command
Some of the most significant obstacles to ethical lawyering arise
from the unique structure of the commission system. The Convening
Authority's control over defense funding and defense counsel's own
interest in future advancement within the military creates strong
disincentives for zealous advocacy. Operating within a chain of
command is nothing new for JAG defense counsel, but operating within
a political chain of command is. Not only is seeking funding from a
political entity a challenge, but defense counsel also have wrestled in the
early days of the commissions with open attempts by DOD political
appointees to direct their lawyering. As Charles Swift, one of the first
defense counsel detailed to the commissions recalled, during the period
before defense counsel were assigned clients, DOD General Counsel
William J. Haynes treated them as his staff attorneys, asking them to
perform tasks for the Convening Authority aimed at strengthening the
commission process. 178 When defense counsel protested on grounds that
such assistance would facilitate the ultimate conviction of their clients
and was not ethically appropriate, their protests were brushed aside.
179
Haynes's orders placed the newly detailed counsel in the challenging
position of estranging the DOD General Counsel (a move not likely to be
advantageous to career advancement) and potentially the Convening
Authority (upon whom they relied for funding) in favor of clients whose
identity they had not yet learned and whose needs they did not yet know.
177. One might argue that, given the inherent professional disincentives faced by
military defense counsel in the commission system, relying on civilian defense counsel
may ameliorate the system's ethical problems. Such an argument underappreciates the
importance of JAG lawyers to the commission system. First, because the military
commission system is fundamentally a courts-martial-based system, JAG experience and
familiarity with the rules are essential. Second, many of the ethical challenges faced by
defense counsel in the commission system are not unique to JAG lawyers-civilian
lawyers and military lawyers alike feel the threat of investigation and challenges
associated with negotiating a guilty plea. Third, because of their unique rule-of-law-
based institutional identity, JAG lawyers' special sensitivity to ethical conflicts has been
highly important in recognizing and highlighting needed improvements in the
commission system, some of which are the focus of this article, which civilian lawyers
less familiar with the military system may not have detected.
178. See Luban, supra note 11, at 2006-07 (citing a telephone interview with Charles
Swift on December 10, 2007).
179. See id.
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This tension between zealous un-conflicted advocacy and
professional advancement has been a recurrent theme for commission
defense counsel. Although some have asserted that this tension is not a
significant factor for JAG lawyers, 80 there can be no dispute that
professional advancement and reputation influence decision-making to
some degree, even for JAG lawyers. As is true for lawyers in other fields
who operate with dual identities, some JAG officers may more closely
associate with one aspect of their professional identity over the other:
professional advancement may be a less salient concern for those JAG
lawyers who view themselves primarily as lawyers rather than officers,
and may be a more salient consideration for those JAG lawyers who
view themselves more as officers than lawyers. 181 Further, even those
JAG lawyers who care little about promotion may care a great deal about
professional punishment or damage to their professional reputations, a
risk also extant in the commission system.
Nor is there any doubt that many JAG lawyers who have vocally
opposed the commission system have faced negative professional
consequences following their commission service. Major Mori, defense
counsel to Australian David Hicks, used vociferous public advocacy,
lambasting the commission system, to win public support for his client in
Australia and, ultimately, leveraged this political capital to obtain a
highly favorable plea deal for his client. Moi was reassigned
immediately after his representation of Hicks concluded and later
complained that he was passed over twice for promotion. 82 William
Kuebler, defense counsel to Canadian Omar Khadr, likewise waged an
aggressive publicity campaign in hopes of securing his client's release.'83
Chief Prosecutor Lawrence Morris's response was a personal attack on
Kuebler's professional reputation: he stated that Kuebler ("[o]ne defense
counsel in particular") had "habitually flouted the rules" and was
"grossly distorting" and "fabricating information."' 84  Commission
prosecutors likewise reported retaliation after speaking out against
ethical improprieties in the commission system.1 85  This perceived
180. Frakt, supra note 90, at 556 ("JAGs are not motivated solely, or even primarily,
by a desire to be promoted and the attendant increase in financial remuneration.").
181. See Robertson, supra note 93; see also supra note 112 (discussing dual identity).
182. Michael J. Lebowitz, Anti-War & Anti-Gitmo: Military Expression and the
Dilemma of Licensed Professionals in Uniform, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 579, 595
(2011) (citing Dunlap & Letendre, supra note 106, at 436-37).
183. See William Glaberson, An Unlikely Antagonist in the Detainees' Comer, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2008, available at http://nyti.ms/RmmAwf.
184. Id.
185. Former Chief Prosecutor Morris Davis reported retaliation following his
resignation. McNeal, supra note 68, at 133. Darrel Vandeveld reported witnessing
official retaliation against Morris Davis and former prosecutor Army Lieutenant Colonel
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retaliation, whether intended by the DOD as such, has sent a clear
message to JAG defense counsel about the types of conduct the
commission system values in its lawyers, the consequences of overly
aggressive advocacy. Taken together with other similar behavior, these
messages have contributed to a negative perception of the commissions'
organizational culture, a perception not easily changed. 186 Regardless of
whether this type of retaliation has or would take place in today's
military commission system under its new leadership, past retaliation and
the lack of protection against its recurrence guarantees its continued role
in defense lawyers' ethical decision-making.
2. Ethical Challenges in Military Lawyering
As veterans of the courts-martial system, JAG lawyers are well
acquainted with the unique challenges inherent in standing opposite their
DOD employer when representing defendants, and they are known for
doing so zealously. Many seasoned JAG lawyers have tales of rejecting
command pressure to throw a case, and most of them recall making the
decision to do so with ease. Such is the institutional identity of JAG
lawyers. But the military commission system has created a unique
dynamic. Not only are these lawyers more dependent on the convening
authority than they would be in the courts-martial system, but they also
are defending enemies of the state, rather than fellow soldiers, in a
proceeding not aimed at maintaining order and discipline, but instead
aimed at neutralizing a terrorist threat. Further, due to the nature of the
commission proceedings and the circumstances of their client's capture,
their most effective advocacy almost invariably is to attack their
employer, the methods it used to capture and interrogate their clients, and
the fundamental integrity of the commission system it has established.
All of these unique aspects of the commission system place JAG lawyers
in a challenging position.
JAG officers face significant challenges when their job requires an
open attack on the policies promoted by the Commander-in-Chief. 87
William Britt, who had spoken publicly against Convening Authority Legal Advisor
Thomas Hartmann. Vandeveld Decl. 1, supra note 82, 12.
186. See McNeal, supra note 68, at 133.
187. Commission Defense Counsel Charles Swift described the ethical discomfort
inherent in arguing, as a member of the military, that President Bush's military order
establishing the tribunals was unconstitutional:
The order had been signed by the president. I knew what that meant. If the
president is involved, the first, most important rule is: Don't embarrass him.
When the president says you are guilty, you better damn well be guilty. I knew
that this was going to be awkward. The job of a military officer is not normally
to make the commander in chief look bad.
Brenner, supra note 136.
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Because attacks on the commission system are standard advocacy for
commission defense counsel, these lawyers must walk a fine line
between verbally attacking the system and running afoul of their
professional obligation as service members to refrain from speaking ill of
commanding officers. When Dan Mori, counsel for David Hicks, openly
charged the military commission system with being rigged, then-Chief
Prosecutor Morris Davis suggested Mori could be court-martialed for
violating the military-law prohibition against speaking disrespectfully of
high U.S. government officials. 188  At least one commentator has
observed that Mori's public advocacy, which included assertions that the
military commission system was "created and controlled by those with a
vested interest only in convictions, ' '189 was "in direct contradiction to his
duties as a military officer" because he had a professional duty to refrain
from criticizing public officials.1 90 If true,' 9' this professional duty
would appear to be inherently in conflict with defense counsel's
obligation to their clients: as William Kuebler, JAG defense counsel for
detainee Omar Khadr, explained: "If we're not advocating against the
process, we're not competently representing our clients."' 92  For past
defense counsel like Mori and Kuebler, as well as for counsel today, the
best defense possible may require running afoul of military leadership
and their own professional interests, an ethical problem that recent
reforms to the commission system have not remedied.
The logistics of military lawyering, including the requirement that
JAG lawyers transfer posts every two to three years, have also created
ethical challenges for JAG commission counsel. Because of the
incredibly slow pace of the military commission proceedings and the
mandatory regular transfer of military lawyers, the Office of Chief
Defense Counsel has struggled to ensure continuity in detainee
representation, with JAG lawyers frequently transferred to new
assignments before their detainee's case concludes. While JAG
188. See Luban, supranote 11,at 2015.
189. Id.
190. Lebowitz, supra note 182, at 594 (observing that Mori's "blistering public
comments" to an Australian audience "appeared to violate at least two limitations of
military expression": using contemptuous language against government officials and
participating in a foreign political demonstration while in uniform) (citing Dunlap &
Letendre, supra note 106, at 436-37).
191. Other observers believe Mori's statements were within the bounds of the ethics
rule on trial publicity and were aimed at the military commission system, not officials,
and therefore were not in violation of the military rules. See Luban, supra note 11, at
2016; see also Ellen Yaroshefsky, Military Lawyering at the Edge of the Rule of Law at
Guantanamo: Should Lawyers Be Permitted to Violate the Law?, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.
563, 572-73 (2007) ("Davis's notion that Mori could have been prosecuted appears far-
fetched.").
192. Glaberson, supra note 183.
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reservists called up from civilian life to serve in the commissions may
extend their tours virtually indefinitely, JAG lawyers coming from active
duty are limited to a one- to three-year stint in the commission system
before being detailed to a new assignment. 193 Moreover, because the
military promotion system strongly disfavors litigation details, there are
significant disincentives against lawyers extending their Guantanamo
assignment beyond one tour, even when doing so may be in their client's
best interest. 
194
Short-term assignments work perfectly well within the courts-
martial system, where motions practice is less frequent, precedent
generally clear, and trials relatively short, but pose real problems in the
commission system. Many JAG lawyers detailed to the commissions
come with only one prior detail as defense counsel, meaning two or three
years of criminal law experience in the courts-martial system, in which
they are defending people charged with minor crimes in single-defendant
cases that rarely involve high volumes of classified information. 195 In
other words, some of the JAG lawyers called upon to defend terrorist
suspects in the commissions-high-profile cases involving serious
crimes-are still relative newcomers to the practice of criminal law.
196
Even seasoned JAG lawyers struggle under the load of representing
Guantanamo detainees in the commission system because important rules
and precedent are still entirely unclear and often require JAG lawyers to
actively lobby Congress at the same time they bear the load of
representing clients in high-profile, sometimes even capital, cases. 197
Add to these challenges the difficulty of mastering dense constitutional,
international, and law of war precedents; complicated classification
procedures; and massive, highly disorganized case files, and a two- to
three-year assignment is hardly enough time for many JAG lawyers to
achieve even the basic level of competency required of a criminal
defense lawyer under the rules of professional conduct.1
98
Short-term details present challenges regarding winning and
keeping client trust as well. Guantanamo detainees frequently are
193. See Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/13, supra note 57.
194. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing military promotion system, which favors
leadership experience over litigation experience).
195. See Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/13, supra note 57; see also Joshua Dratel, How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Military Commissions, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.
1339, 1351-52 (2011).
196. See sources cited supra note 195.
197. Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/13, supra note 57.
198. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012) ("A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.").
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reluctant to meet with appointed counsel, and particularly with a
government-appointed military lawyer. These detainees often have been
victims of abuse at the hands of U.S. personnel, some of whom shared
the uniform of their newly assigned lawyer, and, after a decade of
detention, many are understandably suspicious of the quality of justice
they are likely to receive at the hands of the U.S. government. One JAG
defense lawyer doggedly traveled to GTMO every other week for seven
months before the detainee-client would even allow the lawyer an
audience. 199 It took far longer to gain that detainee's trust.200 The first
lawyer to represent Mohammed Jawad completed his entire one-year
tour without being granted Jawad's authorization to actually represent
him. 20 1 Army Major Amy Fitzgibbons, a reservist, developed a strong
working relationship with Sudanese detainee Noor Uthman Muhammed
during her one-year detail as his defense counsel, extending her
assignment for an additional six months and continuing to serve in a
civilian capacity as lead defense counsel after her tour ended.20 2
Nevertheless, despite Fitzgibbons's express wish to continue
representing Muhammed, the Army issued orders assigning Fitzgibbons
to a new detail in which the representation would not be permitted to
continue.20 Ultimately, Fitzgibbons obtained the court's assistance in
continuing her representation,20 4 but in the process was required to defy
the commanding officers for her new assignment, making the difficult
choice to risk future promotion prospects and military assignments in the
interest of her client. The short-term nature of military assignments is a
natural limit on the ability of military counsel to forge and maintain
strong client relationships, putting JAG lawyers in the difficult position
of either attempting to prolong their assignment-a move inimical to
advancement-or taking the new assignment, letting their client
relationship lapse, and, in some cases, reaffirming their client's distrust
of the commission system.
199. Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/13, supra note 57.
200. Id.
201. Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/7, supra note 48.
202. See Def. Mot. to Retain Military Counsel § 4(c), (g), United States v. Noor
Uthman Muhammed (Mil. Comm'n Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba Mar. 17, 2010), available at
http://1.usa.gov/Oxo21C.
203. Id.; see also Stacy Sullivan, A Lack of Conviction, FOREIGN POL'Y, Jul. 27, 2010,
available at http://bit.ly/TgYeUz.
204. See Order D-022: Mot. to Retain Counsel, Dkt. No. AE055A, United States v.
Noor Uthman Muhammed (Mil. Comm'n Guantinamo Bay, Cuba Mar. 19, 2010),
available at http://bit.ly/uNGVzH.
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3. Professional Pressures Inherent in Guantanamo Lawyering
There are a number of ethical challenges specific to Guantanamo
lawyering. In the early days of the commission system, the political
leadership sought to directly control the scope of defense counsel's
representation. When Swift was detailed to represent Salim Hamdan, he
was told that his six-week assignment would be to negotiate a guilty plea
for his client.205 In other words, to gain access to his client at all, Swift
was forced to agree to a representation limited to a guilty plea
negotiation-an agreement he knew might not be in the best interest of
his client.206  Although Rule 1.2 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct states that the client is to determine the objectives of
representation,20 7 Swift had to violate this rule in order to access his
client. As evidenced by the Supreme Court's Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
decision 208, handed down three years after Swift began his "six-week"
representation of Hamdan, Swift ultimately declined to negotiate the 20-
year prison term deal.20 9 The Convening Authority no longer attempts to
set up-front parameters on the length or substance of defense counsel's
representation of its client, though there is nothing preventing it from
doing so. Nevertheless, commission defense counsel still face the
problem of having to agree to government restrictions that they may
view as at odds with their ethical duties in order to gain access to their
client.210
Yet an additional ethical hurdle for commission defense counsel
arises in connection with those detainees who have refused counsel or
may be mentally incompetent, an ethical challenge which frequently
occurs in detainee representation. The 2009 MCA provides detainees the
right to qualified self-representation, but earlier versions of the
205. Brenner, supra note 136.
206. Id. Likewise, all lawyers must sign highly restrictive protective orders to gain
access to their clients at GTMO.
207. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012).
208. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
209. Jonathan Mahler, Hamdan: Guantanamo's Mystery Man, TIME, July 21, 2008,
available at http://ti.me/5qK6f3. Hamdan was ultimately acquitted of conspiracy but
convicted of providing material support to terrorism. He returned home to Yemen within
a year of his conviction.
210. These rules, which apply to lawyers with habeas proceedings in Article III
courts as well, prevent defense counsel from disclosing to the detainee any classified
information-even when that classified information includes statements that the detainee
made to interrogators-and restricts defense counsel from discussing anything other than
information "directly related to counsel's defense of a detainee in the military
commission cases." See Press Release, N.Y. State Bar, New York Bar Association
Criticizes Protective Order Affecting Counsel for Guantanamo Detainees (Apr. 21,
2011), available at http://bit.ly/W5Jtdl.
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commissions did not.211  Even today, the judge must authorize self-
representation. Where such requests have been rejected, defense counsel
assigned to represent these detainees find themselves in the unenviable
position of either violating the rules of professional ethics or risking
contempt of court.212 When Major Tom Fleener's client, al Bahlul,
requested to represent himself, the judge denied that request. 213 Fleener
refused to return to counsel's table until ordered to do so by the judge.214
When al Bahlul was tried before the military commissions in 2008, he
ordered his counsel, David Frakt, not to participate in the commission
proceeding. 215 Faced with a direct, lawful request from his client, Frakt
did the only thing he believed he ethically could do: he refused to
participate in the commission proceeding, despite a court order to the
contrary. Instead, Frakt remained silent while his client was tried and
sentenced to life imprisonment.216  Although Frakt indicated that al
211. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975) (finding that the Sixth
Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right to conduct his or her own defense in a
criminal case and, to proceed pro se, the defendant must knowingly and intelligently
waive the right to counsel); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 169 (1984) (holding
that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a trial judge appoints stand-by counsel,
even over defendant's objection, in order to ensure that the defendant understands and
follows "basic rules of courtroom protocol"); 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(D) (2006 & Supp.
2009) (right to self-representation if "accused knowingly and competently waives
assistance of counsel" and "conform[s] the accused's deportment and the conduct of the
defense to the rules of evidence, procedure, and decorum applicable to trials by military
commission").
212. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(3) (2012) ("[A] lawyer shall not
represent a client . . . if the lawyer is discharged.").
213. See, e.g., Sean Flynn, The Defense Will Not Rest, GQ MAG. (July 2007),
available at http://gqm.ag/9t5xJP (recounting the story of William Kuebler and Tom
Fleener who were ordered by military commission judge to continue to represent their
clients after being fired).
214. Of course, on the other side of the dilemma are the difficult ethical questions
associated with the "volunteer" problem: when a client wants to plead guilty out of a
desire for execution. Lawyers for the alleged 9/11 co-conspirators have run into this
issue head-on, as did counsel for Zacarias Moussaoui who objected repeatedly as his
client sought self-representation. See Edward McMahon, Def. Counsel to Zacarias
Moussaoui, Defending Terrorists, Remarks at Univ. of Va. Miller Cent. (Jan. 30, 2009),
available at http://bit.ly/X6t4n0. Applying David Luban's analysis of the Unabomber
representation, in which he condemned Ted Kaczynski's lawyers for portraying him as a
lunatic against his will and thereby desecrating his life's work in an effort to save his life,
one might ask whether defense counsel acts appropriately when it prevents a detainee-
client set on martyrdom from achieving it. See Luban, supra note 11, at 1983-86.
215. The Guantanamo Docket: Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, N.Y TIMES,
http://nyti.ms/Tpml36 (last visited Oct. 13, 2012).
216. David Mcfadden, At Gitmo, Life Sentence for Bin Laden Propagandist, USA
TODAY (Nov. 4, 2008, 6:14 AM), available at http://usat.ly/RggOQ4.
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Bahlul had several strong defenses, 217 al Bahlul insisted from the
beginning that he would represent himself or not be represented at all.
For those defense counsel representing multiple clients in a system
with virtually no precedent, detainees who wish to represent themselves
or to boycott the process can present a unique ethical challenge. At the
time that Frakt obeyed al Bahlul's request to boycott his trial, Frakt also
was zealously defending a client he believed innocent of the charges
against him, some of which charges were identical to those al Bahlul was
refusing to contest. Frakt was faced with the choice of serving one
client's best interest over the best interest of the other: watching the
government impose without counter-argument an interpretation of the
law in al Bahlul's case that subsequently may be found persuasive by
Jawad's judge (a likely outcome given the lack of military commission
precedent), or contesting the charges against al Bahlul in direct
contravention of al Bahlul's order.218 In other words, failure to object to
the government's arguments in al Bahlul's case could easily result in
those arguments being embraced at the Commission Review level,
thereby contributing to binding precedent on future proceedings against
Jawad and others. Frakt was forced to perform the legal equivalent of a
tightrope walk between the interests of his two clients. Frakt took to
communicating with the judge by informal note, in which he would
remind the judge that he was precluded from representing al Bahlul, but
would speculate regarding what one might argue if one were acting as al
219Bahlul's attorney.
Defense counsel also have been forced into difficult ethical
situations by intrusive government security measures that infringe on
attomey-client privilege in the name of national security and which,
intentionally or not, chill zealous and effective advocacy. Controversy
over whether Guantanamo Bay administrators can review attorney-client
mail has been ongoing since the early days of the commission. That
controversy heated up in December 2011 when Guantanamo commander
Rear Admiral David Woods adopted a rule allowing more expansive
review of legal mail. 220 The Guantanamo military leadership defended
217. Despite al Bahlul's rejection of the commission process, because appeals are
automatic in the commission system (and al Bahlul did not order his counsel to file a
motion to deviate from this standard practice), his case currently is on appeal to the D.C.
Circuit, where some of these questions are likely to be explored. See Brief of Pet'r, al
Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 2012).
218. Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/7, supra note 48. Judge Gregory already had made
clear that withdrawal was not an option. See Andy Worthington, An Empty Trial at
Guantanamo, ANDY WORTHINGTON BLOG (Oct. 27, 2008), http://bit.ly/SSPg3E.
219. See supra note 218.
220. Ben Fox, Suit Challenges New Guantanamo Prison Mail Rule, THE GUARDIAN
(UK), Feb. 10, 2012, available at http://bit.ly/W5UdZc. Interestingly, in court, a
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the policy as necessary for national and base security, 22' whereas defense
lawyers have decried it as violating attorney-client privilege.222  In
February 2012, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers'
Ethics Advisory Committee instructed commission defense counsel that
[because the Guantanamo review policy] create[s] a conflict between
defense counsels' duty to not disclose client confidences without the
client's informed consent and counsels' duty to provide competent
representation . . . [defense counsel must] cease meaningful
communications with their clients to protect confidences.
22 3
The opinion was released even as the al-Nashiri judge considered a
motion by defense counsel to block review of attorney mail, a request
that the military commission court might not have the authority to
enforce even if granted.2 24 In the meanwhile, defense counsel was forced
to choose between communicating with their clients in preparation for
defending the capital charges against them, or avoiding mail
communications because of their inability to ensure attorney-client
privilege.225
The ever-present threat of government investigation also has created
ethical challenges for defense counsel. Counsel for alleged 9/11 co-
conspirator Ramzi bin al Shibh were the subject of an official inquiry
initiated by prosecutors under the false assumption that defense counsel
commission defended the new review process as justified due to an al Qaeda-published
Inspire magazine "getting in" to detainees. Woods later publicly contradicted that
assertion, noting that GTMO censors had intercepted the publication as part of the regular
review process. Carol Rosenberg, Admiral: Al Qaida Magazine Didn't Reach Captives,
MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 2, 2012, available at http://hrld.us/ySQCVv.
221. See Associated Press, Maryland: Review of Detainees' Mail Is Defended, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, available at http://nyti.ms/wA6fzP.
222. See Benjamin Wittes & Ritika Singh, AI-Nashiri #8: You've Got Mail-And l'm
Going to Read It!, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 18, 2012, 1:24 PM), http://bit.ly/PuqY03.
223. NAT'L Ass'N CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, NACDL ETHICS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
OPINION 12-02 (2012), available at http://bit.ly/T 1170Z.
224. Questions remain whether commission judges have authority to order the joint
task force ("JTF") that runs the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. When Ibrahim al-Qosi
pled guilty, his plea agreement included a provision that he be kept in Camp 4 and not
placed in isolation. Ultimately, JTF refused to honor this request, and the judge changed
her order from stating that failure to keep al Qosi in Camp 4 would nullify the plea deal
to one in which she "'highly recommend[ed]' that al Qosi be placed in Camp 4" but made
clear that failure to do so would not violate the plea agreement. Andrea Prasow, A Trial
within a Trial: Justice, Guantanamo-Style, JURIST, Aug. 19, 2010, available at
http:/fbit.ly/ST64al.
225. Chief Defense Counsel for the Military Commissions issued a memorandum to
all attorneys analyzing the applicable rules of court and professional conduct and advised
defense counsel not to submit attorney-client privileged materials to the Privilege Team
for review. See Mem. from U.S. Marine Corps Col. J.P. Colwell, Chief Defense Counsel,
to the Office of Chief Defense Counsel (Jan. 13, 2012), available at
http://bit.ly/OxRYLc.
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had disclosed classified information to the detainee's habeas counsel.226
This investigation forced counsel to respond to these contentions while
also pursuing the defense of the detainee and, as part of this
investigation, the FBI entered defense counsel's offices and conducted an
interrogation regarding purported violations of classified information
rules.227 Likewise, civilian commission defense lawyer Clive Stafford
Smith was called into court in 2009 to respond to charges that he had
228violated classification rules in a letter written to the President. None
of these charges were ultimately substantiated.229
The open threat of investigation of commission defense counsel
poses multiple ethical concerns. First, this type of investigation often
gives government investigators reason to access sensitive attorney-client
privileged information, in violation of the protections guaranteed those
communications in federal court.230 Second, for military lawyers whose
employment depends on their ability to respect classification rules, these
types of allegations and the media's coverage of them poses serious risks
to professional reputation and advancement. 231 Third, for those detainees
for whom transfer out of Guantanamo Bay is a goal, success often turns
on positive media coverage of the case in the press both domestically and
abroad, and the tone of that coverage is put at risk by allegations of
attorney impropriety and national security violations.
Perhaps most importantly, allegations of security violations are
susceptible to opportunistic use because classification determinations are
in many cases subjective, entirely within the government's control, and
non-appealable.232 In an effort to maximize protection of classified
226. Pet. for Writ of Mandamus and Writ of Prohibition at 19-20, In re Al Shibh, No.
09-1238 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 2009).
227. Id. (referencing Peter Finn, Lawyers Showed Photos of Covert CIA Officers to
Guantanamo Bay Detainees, WASH. POsT, Aug. 21, 2009, http://wapo.st/28Uelx).
228. Famed Gitmo Lawyer Facing Six Months in Prison for Writing Letter to Obama
Detailing Torture of Client, ALTERNET (Apr. 2, 2009), http://bit.ly/QYpKsZ.
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 502.
231. Allegations of improperly disclosing information to detainee clients is a
particularly sensitive charge to defense counsel, perhaps particularly so given the
conviction of defense lawyer Lynne F. Stewart for material support of terrorism as a
result of improper disclosures she made during her representation of terrorist spiritual
leader Omar Abdel Rahman. Gregory P. Noone & Diana C. Noone, The Military
Commissions-A Possible Strength Giving Way to a Probable Weakness-and the
Required Fix, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 523, 526 (2004); Lynne Stewart, Defending the
Right to Defend, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 85 n.14 (2003).
232. In some commission cases, the intelligence agencies have delegated to the
prosecution the ability to deem evidence classified. The incentives of intelligence
agencies naturally veer toward over-classification, and the fact that defense counsel must
notify the prosecution prior to introducing any of the classified evidence they intend to
introduce only serves to increase the likelihood that unclassified information will be
designated classified. See Mil. Comm'n Interview 9/13, supra note 57. In the case of
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information, intelligence agencies have in some instances even delegated
to commission prosecutors the authority to categorize evidence as
classified. This delegation not only increases the incidence of closed
courtrooms, but also requires defense counsel to give the government
advance notice of the substance of any argument they make in court that
might reference evidence the prosecution has deemed classified,
regardless of whether the hearing is open to the public.233 Given the
agency's institutional interest in over-classification, commission judges'
lack of authority over classification decisions or release of classified
information, and the strategic value to the prosecution of classifying
information, it is no surprise that over-classification of evidence in the
commission system has reached an all-time high.
The open and amorphous threat of a classification misstep-
particularly where classification determinations are strategic and
subjective-puts significant pressure on defense counsel to be far more
cautious in their advocacy and public statements than lawyers in federal
court would be, as well as far more cautious in client communications, an
instinct often in tension with a client's best interest. Defense lawyers
have been ordered on at least one occasion to keep the identities of
prosecution witnesses secret from their own client.234 In another
instance, defense lawyers were on the receiving end of allegations of
leaking the identity of CIA agents to their clients, an allegation later
withdrawn by the Department of Justice.235 The fear of a classification
misstep and subsequent government investigation is present in all
national security cases but is particularly powerful in military
commission court, a system created expressly to give the government
wide latitude in protecting classified information and in which
commission judges are required to be highly deferential to government
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, for instance, the government has made the somewhat
arbitrary determination that anything Mohammed says or has said meets the definition of
"classified." Id.
233. See id.
234. William Glaberson, Witness Names to Be Withheld from Guantanamo Detainee,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2007, available at http://nyti.ms/R5kNgz.
235. See Charlie Savage, Ex-C.IA. Officer Charged in Information Leak, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2012, available at http://nyti.ms/zlDDFt. The investigation began when 32
pages of photographs were found in the cells of several Guantanamo detainees, photo
line-ups of random people and suspected interrogators that the attorneys were using to
identify potential witnesses who could testify about detainee abuse as mitigating evidence
in their client's death penalty case. Discovery of the photographs caused uproar within
the CIA, which initially pressed for an FBI investigation of Guantanamo detainee
lawyers. The criminal complaint filed against the alleged source of the leak, a CIA
employee, expressly cleared Guantanamo lawyers of wrongdoing. Id.
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236 Ti eernetlawyers and intelligence agencies. This deterrence to aggressive
advocacy not only puts defense counsel in a difficult ethical situation, but
also makes conviction more likely than it would be in other forums.
Finally, although the pressure to plead guilty is substantial in every
criminal justice system, the pressure to plead guilty in the Guantanamo
Bay commission system is unmatched, which brings its own set of
ethical challenges for defense counsel. Given the possibility of indefinite
detention and, in some cases, the questionable prospect of ever receiving
a military commission hearing (a concern heightened by the slow pace of
proceedings to date), there is little incentive for any detainee to wait
patiently for trial. At the same time, the prospect of indefinite detention
is such that the prosecution has little incentive to enter plea negotiations.
While the 2008 election of Barack Obama (and his campaign promise to
close GTMO) temporarily accelerated the pace of negotiations, there is at
present little to no public pressure to process the detainees speedily.
237
For the terrorist "foot soldiers" held at Guantanamo, individuals who do
not pose a significant ongoing threat to national security, who have no
ties to prominent defendants, and who are not likely to face any near-
term commission hearing, the ultimate sentence is likely to be far shorter
than the period already spent in confinement. Such a result creates both
significant pressure to plead guilty and incredibly little bargaining power
with which to do so. 238 When compounded by the government's inability
to transfer out of Guantanamo detainees that it may no longer have an
interest in holding, the pressure on these detainees to plead guilty-even
236. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing differences in judicial role under CIPA versus
MCA); see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing how judicial deference, whether perceived
or real, impacts prosecutorial decision-making).
237. In a February 2012 Washington Post-ABC News Poll, 70% of respondents
indicated approval of Obama's decision to keep open the Guantanamo Bay detention
center. Scott Wilson & Jon Cohen, Poll Finds Broad Support for Obama's
Counterterrorism Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2012, available at
http://wapo.st/AmGGUx. Although there is little public pressure to swiftly process
detainees, commission prosecutors have a strategic interest in securing plea agreements
with detainees with ties to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the other 9/11 co-conspirators, and
al-Nashiri. These detainees, whose testimony helps prosecutors avoid using evidence
associated with occasionally torturous interrogations, have a window of time between
now and those trials in which they may be able to secure a plea deal by testifying for the
prosecution. See, e.g., Peter Finn, Plea Deal in Terror Suspect's Military Trial Sparks
Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2012, available at http://wapo.st/ApQ2Fe (Mark Martins
references ongoing plea negotiations with other GTMO detainees).
238. Those detainees who have been subject to overly aggressive interrogation may
have bargaining power once charged (given the likely inadmissibility of their statements
to interrogators and the government's interest in concealing its use of tactics some would
characterize as torture), but given the prosecution's complete control over who is charged
and when-and given the consequence-free alternative of indefinite detention-these
detainees' mistreatment gives them little additional leverage in the near-term.
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to crimes for which they may not be responsible-is incredibly high.23 9
Advising a client on a guilty plea is fraught with ethical challenges under
even the best circumstances, 240 but doing so with the limited information
and incredibly limited bargaining power extant in the military
commission system is particularly challenging. Some detainees have
spent over a decade in detention and have no immediate prospects for
release. Thus, defense counsel face the choice of convincing their client
to plead guilty-potentially to crimes of which they are innocent-in the
hope of winning some specified term of confinement, or, in the
alternative, leaving their clients, many of whom already struggle with
confidence in their lawyers and the commission system, with no recourse
but to wait.
Indefinite detention, in particular, ensures that plea bargain
negotiations are heavily weighted in the prosecution's favor. Where the
alternative to a guilty plea is an indefinite stay at Guantanamo, defense
counsel may feel particularly pressured to secure a plea agreement and
advise a client to take it, however unfavorable and draconian the terms.
For instance, in plea deals ranging from al-Qosi's to Majid Khan's,
defense counsel have advised their clients to sign plea agreements that
include a provision expressly preserving the government's right to
continue holding the detainees indefinitely, even after the agreed-upon
sentence has been served. Given the alternative of indefinite or virtually
indefinite detention, defense counsel have had little choice but to agree.
Majid Khan seemed to sum up defense counsel's common feeling during
his guilty plea colloquy, when Judge James Pohl asked him whether he
agreed to that specific provision: "I'm making a leap of faith here, sir,
that's all I can do., 24 1 The pressure to plead guilty raises a host of legal
ethical issues for defense counsel that lack any clear resolution and are
aggravated by the manner in which the commission system operates.
III. THE PATH AHEAD
The ethical challenges and practical difficulties inherent in
lawyering in the military commission system implicate the fundamental
239. There is ample literature documenting the systemic pressure to plead guilty to
crimes that involve only low-level punishments. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, TH4E PROCESS IS
THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 30, 200-01 (1979); see
also Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1134-35 (2008); lan
Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1157, 1170-75 (2004).
240. See, e.g., Lee Bridges, The Ethics of Representation on Guilty Pleas, 9 LEGAL
ETHICS 80 (2006) (discussing scholarship on legal ethical issues surrounding guilty
pleas).
241. Peter Finn, Guantanamo Detainee Majid Khan Pleads Guilty, Promises
Cooperation, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2012, available at http://wapo.st/Rv0E2C.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
fairness of that system. Although other criminal justice systems
occasionally manifest some of the same types of pressures and incentives
analyzed above, particularly in high-profile terrorism-related
prosecutions, the commission system is unique in terms of the
consistency and the magnitude of the ethical conflicts and professional
pressures its lawyers face. The commission system aggravates the
ethical challenges counsel typically encounter in a terrorism prosecution
and makes ethical decision-making more challenging. These ethical
challenges each work to disadvantage detainee defendants, favoring
conviction in a way not seen in Article III or courts-martial proceedings.
Because these challenges result in a justice system slanted toward
conviction, a close look at the lawyering in Guantanamo Bay points
toward the need for significant reform to the commission system. As
detailed above, the structural failings of the commission system that
resulted in the early political scandals have not been remedied. Until
these failings are resolved, the system will continue to be at risk for
political manipulation and will continue to be perceived as such by the
JAG lawyers who operate the commissions. Although the military
commissions' credibility problem may be on the mend for some
domestic critics, 242 the ethical problems that inhere to the system make
clear that the appointment and hard work of highly credentialed, well-
reputed personnel 243 only puts the veneer of fairness on a system that
remains fundamentally flawed.
The lack of structural reform to the commissions not only creates a
problem with regard to the fairness of GTMO hearings, it also creates
problems for the country's counterterrorism efforts.244 Indeed, given the
international incredulity the military commission system has inspired, the
United States has a national and strategic interest in ensuring that the
highest standards of ethical conduct are observed in these commission
242. See Editorial Board, A Terrorist's Fair Deal, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2012,
available at http://wapo.st/zbSBg2 ("For too long, military proceedings at Guantanamo
were tragically flawed, unfair both to defendants and to the victims of terrorism.
Congress addressed these shortcomings in 2009 by vastly improving military
commissions, in large part by shoring up legal protections for defendants."); see also
Benjamin Wittes, Darrel Vandeveld on Reformed Military Commissions, LAWFARE BLOG
(Mar. 8, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://bit.ly/ArGcgF/ (posting e-mail from former commission
critic Darrel Vandeveld, withdrawing his initial opposition to the commission system, as
established under the 2009 MCA, and attributing his change of heart in part to "a new-
found faith in the competence of those who will prosecute, defend, and judge
Guantanamo detainees brought to trial in these reformed commissions").
243. See supra note 12.
244. See, e.g., Prasow, supra note 14; Melina Milazzo, Khan Military Commission
Conviction Not a Win for America's Justice System, HUM. RTS. FIRST BLOG (Mar. 1,
2012), http://bit.ly/yqwsc0.
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proceedings.245  Some allies have refused to produce witnesses and
evidence or extradite defendants where the military commission system
was a possible forum for prosecution.246 While military commission
advocates tout the commission system's procedural protections as above
and beyond those required under international law and used in many
European criminal justice systems,247 the United States' European allies
largely have remained skeptical of the commission system's fundamental
fairness. This skepticism is perhaps in part due to potential liability they
may face as parties to the European Court of Human Rights for
participating in any way in the commission system.
248
Although the most frequently referenced remedy for the
commission system's problems has been a return to Article III courts,
Congress's firm opposition to Article III trials for Guantanamo detainees
reveals this option as unrealistic. Congress has repeatedly blocked the
transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the United States for trial.249
Despite President Obama's early commitment to Article III terrorist
prosecution, Attorney General Eric Holder has reaffirmed the
administration's ongoing commitment to the use of commission courts,
and Obama made no repeat of his earlier promise to close GTMO in his
recent campaign for reelection.25° It is clear that the military
commissions are here to stay. Accordingly, the best bet for mitigating
the ethical challenges inherent in military commission lawyering likely is
to reform the commissions.
245. See, e.g., Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization through Trials for
Violations of Law: Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L LAW 427 (2009) (noting international
capital to be gained through successful terrorist convictions).
246. See Jordan J. Paust, Serial War Crimes in Response to Terrorism Can Pose
Threats to National Security, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 5201, 5211-12 (2009) ("A senior
European Union official ... doubted that any of the 15 [EU] nations ... would agree to
extradition that involved the possibility of a military trial.") (citation omitted).
247. See John D. Altenburg, Jr., Military Commissions, in THE LAW OF
COUNTERTERRORISM 142,148 (Lynne K. Zusman ed., 2011).
248. See, e.g., Application, al-Nashiri v. Poland, (Eur. Ct. H. R. May 6, 2011),
available at http://bit.ly/T19V7B (application requesting European Court of Human
Rights to find that Poland violated al-Nashiri's rights under European law by permitting
CIA detention and torture and ultimately permitting his transfer to Guantanamo Bay).
249. See Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the
Laws of War-Part I, LAWFARE BLOG (Dec. 31, 2011, 4:43 PM), http://bit.ly/uP6WjW
(detailing the provisions of the latest Defense Authorization bill, which includes a
prohibition on using federal funds to transfer GTMO detainees to the United States for
any purpose, effectively prohibiting trial in Article III courts); see also David J.R. Frakt,
The Constitutional Clash over Detainees and the Closure of Guantanamo, 74 U. PITT. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012).
250. See Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Speech at Northwestern University School of
Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://Il .usa.gov/y8SorL.
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Legislative reform to the military commission system may be a
more realistic solution than abandoning the commissions. However,
legislative reform is far from an easy path given the current adversarial
political climate. Although Congress responded quickly in both 2006
and 2009 to presidential requests for military commission legislation and
reform, moving any legislation through the current divided Congress is
likely to be challenging.251 But strengthening the military commission
process is a goal in which both parties have an interest, and the reforms
proposed herein lack some of the guaranteed partisan conflict inherent in
reform to evidentiary rules and due process rights. While reforms aimed
at increasing or decreasing the procedural protections afforded terrorist
suspects would almost certainly be contentious, reforms to protect
military lawyers and preserve their professional independence are more
likely to receive bipartisan support. This Article proposes increasing the
institutional protection afforded military judges, designating a clear body
of binding precedent, and requiring congressional confirmation of the
Convening Authority.252
While courts-martial judges may not require the institutional
protections of set terms of service or life tenure, the political pressures
inherent in the military commission system make the commission system
a different story. Fairly or unfairly, many perceive military judges as
253favoring the prosecution. Indeed, military judges, as JAG lawyers and
members of the military, face similar ethical pressures to those faced by
commission prosecutions and defense counsel.254  Accordingly,
251. See generally Olympia J. Snowe, Why I'm Leaving the Senate, WASH. POST,
Mar. 1, 2012, available at http://wapo.st/xQuX9h (observing, after a 17-year career in the
Senate, that "[tjhe Senate of today routinely jettisons regular order ... serially legislates
by political brinkmanship.. . and habitually eschews full debate and an open amendment
process in favor of competing up-or-down, take-it-or-leave-it proposals").
252. These proposals are clearly not a complete fix for the various institutional and
practical problems that inhere to commission lawyering, as detailed in Part II supra. For
instance, the lack of oversight and review with regard to classification decisions-
exacerbated by the delegation of classification authority to prosecutors in some
commission cases-creates significant ethical challenges for both prosecutors and
defense counsel. Full exploration of a solution to the classification problem (which
plagues both Article III and commission courts) is beyond the scope of this article. It
deserves noting, however, that Federal District Court Judge Leonie Brinkema-whose
time presiding over the Moussaoui trial and other cases involving voluminous classified
information has given her close familiarity with the use and misuse of classified evidence
in terrorist prosecution-has suggested that Congress should create an independent
government agency that could review cases in which prosecutors and a judge disagree on
classification questions. See Kramer, supra note 139.
253. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing perception of military judges favoring
government positions and how this perception impacts prosecutorial decision-making).
254. Military judges do not serve in that capacity indefinitely, as federal judges do.
Rather, military judges are JAG lawyers who have been recognized as credentialed to
serve as a judge, but who only do so when detailed by the military to a specific case.
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commission judges would not only benefit from the provision of set
terms, but also from Congress designating a body of binding precedent
upon which they could rely, whether it be UCMJ law or Article III
law.255 Designating a body of law to serve as commission precedent will
not resolve many of the significant legal questions lingering over the
military commission system, such as whether constitutional protections
apply to detainees.2 56 However, it would provide commission judges
with a working body of law to rely upon in resolving some of the many
challenging legal questions raised in the commissions on a daily basis.
Binding precedent would not only increase legal clarity for the
prosecution and defense counsel-providing a stronger basis for their
legal arguments and strategy and potentially making Brady decision-
making slightly easier-it would create more consistency and
predictability in commission system rulings, thereby increasing the
credibility of the institution among both its practitioners and its
observers. Allowing commission judges to draw upon settled law would
also reduce accusations and public perception of pro-government bias,
and it would provide judges the solid legal support-a clear rule of
law-to rely on in making controversial decisions, insulating them from
professional risks they may otherwise face if erring in a close call on the
side of a Guantanamo defendant.
Moreover, with these additional protections for judicial
independence in place, control over defense counsel funding potentially
could be transferred from the Convening Authority to the military
commission judge, establishing a system more closely analogous to the
well-established, and better-insulated, Article III funding process for
court-appointed counsel. These reforms would bolster the professional
independence of commission judges and defense counsel and increase
legal certainty in the system, thereby improving public perception of the
system and the system's legitimacy.
The commission system would further benefit from increased
insulation from political forces within the Executive Branch. As
evidenced by the political pressure exerted on the Chief Prosecutor's
Office by Brigadier-General Hartmann and DOD General Counsel
When they are not detailed to serve as a judge, military judges serve as JAG lawyers in
the same capacity that other JAG lawyers do. As such, all of the same concerns about
discipline and professional reputation that influence JAG lawyers would apply equally to
military judges. For a discussion of these concerns in the context of JAG prosecutors and
defense counsel, see Part II supra.
255. Article III precedent is much more abundant with regard to the areas of law most
likely to be relevant to the military commission system and is generally more expansive
given its comparative volume and history. Thus, Article III precedent would likely be
preferable in this context.
256. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 6.
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Haynes, and as evidenced by Convening Authority Susan Crawford's
effective stonewalling of defense requests for funding, the fact that the
commission system has been run by political appointees working with no
Congressional oversight has created significant ethical challenges for
commission lawyers. Creating a congressional role in the appointment
of the Convening Authority would apply a layer of accountability to the
selection and conduct of the Convening Authority. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, inserting Congress into the commission system may actually
decrease the politicization of the process, improve the overall perception
of the fairness and transparency of the commission system, and ensure
that political exigency would be a less controlling factor in decisions
about which charges to bring, against whom, and how and with whom to
engage in plea bargaining. This process is required for federal judges,
U.S. Attorneys, and many other high-level political appointees; thus,
instituting it in the commissions is hardly a radical concept.25 7  While
adding Congress to any decision-making process brings a degree of
politicization to the selection process, requiring Congress to periodically
review the system through the confirmation process may inspire more
devoted attempts at impartiality from the Convening Authority.
Congressional oversight may also discourage future presidents from
attempting to appoint a Convening Authority with a clear political
agenda that may be at odds with rule-of-law values.
As others have observed, there is no perfect forum for terrorist
prosecution, but what is clear from an analysis of the lawyers on the
ground is that the military commission system as presently constituted is
not the "least worst" alternative pundits had hoped it would be.258 While
Article III courts have some appeal as the historically tried-and-true
257. While the Appointments Clause limits which appointments Congress may vest
power in the President to make, it does not limit Congress's ability to require
congressional confirmation of officers' appointments. Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two
Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 J. CONST. L.
745, 749 (2008). Although the Supreme Court has held that Senate confirmation is not
required for military judges, an argument may exist that the standing authority granted to
the Convening Authority might require Senate advice and consent, particularly for a
civilian appointee. See generally Victor Hansen, Changes in Modern Military Codes and
the Role of the Military Commander: What Should the United States Learn from this
Revolution?, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 419, 446 (2008) (analyzing Weiss v. United
States, 510 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1994), which rejected the need for military judge
confirmation because (1) Senate advice and consent is given whenever military officers
are promoted in rank, (2) there is a long tradition of officer involvement in military
justice, and (3) military judges have no inherent judicial authority until detailed to a
specific case).
258. Robert Chesney, The Least Worst Venue, FOREIGN POL'Y, Jan. 21, 2011,
available at http://bit.ly/gL9f50 ("The Obama administration's plan to resume military
commission trials for Guantanamo detainees isn't as terrible as civil liberties advocates
think.").
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venue for terrorism prosecution, access to Article III courts for the
Guantanamo detainees is currently unrealistic. Accordingly, the most
practical solution may be a military commission system that is
"revamped" yet again in the ways described above. This approach has
practical challenges of its own and is certain to face political obstacles
along the way.259 Furthermore, congressional agreement on anything-
and particularly on national security matters-is no foregone conclusion.
Nevertheless, the type of reform advocated herein is of a nature likely to
be less contentious than past Guantanamo legislative reform efforts and,
among the available options, MCA reform may be best-suited for
supporting commission lawyers in their dedication to both the rules of
professional responsibility and their military leadership.
CONCLUSION
The military commission system cannot be trusted to produce
credible convictions until the fundamental problems in the system that
contribute to its challenging ethical environment are remedied. The
prosecution of terrorist suspects presents a host of thorny ethical
challenges in any forum, but these challenges are most severe and
pervasive in the military commission context. While legal scholars have
expended a great deal of ink exploring the political and constitutional
problems with military commission prosecution, thus far this body of
literature has largely overlooked the lawyers on the ground in
Guantanamo Bay. The lesson learned from these lawyers is that, due to
institutional identity, political influence, professional disincentives, over-
classification, and structural inefficiencies, the significant challenges
inherent in terrorist prosecution are amplified in the military commission
context and are augmented by unique ethical concerns that do not occur
in other forums. A close look at the lawyers on the ground in
Guantanamo reveals that there are subtle but identifiable institutional,
ethical, and professional pressures at work on the lawyers involved in the
Guantanamo Bay military commissions. Taken cumulatively, these
pressures materially affect the allocation of justice and due process in
that criminal justice system, thereby calling into question the
fundamental legitimacy of the commission system and demonstrating the
need for further legislative reform.
259. There is no shortage of recent examples of political dysfunction in the U.S.
government, as evidenced by the unsuccessful debate in 2011 over raising the debt
ceiling and the wrangling last year over the Guantanamo provisions included in the
Defense Authorization Act. See, e.g., Press Release, President of the U.S., Statement by
the President on H.R. 1540 (Dec. 31,2011), available at http://l.usa.gov/uUNbOv.

